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INTRODUCMON
When a shareholder transfers to a corporation its own stock in
exchange for money or other property, the transaction may re-
semble either an ordinary sale of stock to an outsider in an arm s
length bargain or the receipt by the shareholder of a dividend from
the corporation. The "sale" analogy is appropriate, for example,
when the owner of preferred stock instructs his broker to sell his
stock and the broker by chance effects a sale to the corporation,
which happens to be buying up its preferred stock at the time. The
preferred shareholder ought to be able to treat the transaction like
any other sale, reporting the difference between his adjusted basis
and the sales price as capital gain or loss. On the other hand, when
the owner of a one-man corporation having only common stock
outstanding forgoes dividends for a period of years and then sells
some of his shares to the corporation for cash, the transaction is
more like a "dividend" than a "sale." Although the shareholder
has surrendered some of his stock, his interest in the corporation's
assets and his control of the corporation's fate are undisturbed. If
the transaction were not taxed as a "dividend," moreover, the share-
holder could enter upon a long-range program of intermittent
transfers of stock to his corporation, employing tax-free stock divi-
dends if necessary to replace his shares and to restore the corpora-
tion's stated capital for the benefit of nervous creditors. For share-
holders who could adopt such a plan of intermittent "sales" of
stock, the tax on dividend income would become a dead letter.
It should not be surprising, then, that a sale of stock by a share-
holder to his corporation is sometimes taxed as a dividend instead
of a sale. The knotty problem that has faced Congress, the Treas-
ury and the courts over the years-a problem for which there can
never be a universally acceptable solution-is the determination of
which transfers of stock are to be classified as "dividends" and
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which as "sales."' For a period of more than thirty years, ending
in 1954, the general rule was that such transactions were sales' un-
less the transaction was "essentially equivalent to the distribution
of a taxable dividend," in which event the entire distribution was
taxed as a dividend to the extent of current and post-I9I3 earnings
and profits.' Although the 1954 Code seeks to provide a more re-
liable formula, it preserves this ancient and troublesome phrase.'
Thus there is no escape from a few words of history before we
turn to the statutory language of the 1954 Code.'
The "essentially equivalent" phrase first appeared in the Reve-
nue Act of 192I.' On providing that stock dividends should not be
taxed,' Congress recognized the possibility, already described, that
stock dividends might be issued and then promptly redeemed as a
1. Throughout this Article the statement that a distribution in redemption of stock is
to be treated as a "dividend" is predicated on an assumption that the corporation has earn-
ings and profits to cover the amount of the distribution. The statement that a redemption is
to be treated as a "sale" or an "exchange" means that the distribution in redemption of stock
is to be treated as payment in exchange for the stock. It is assumed throughout that the
redeemed stock is a capital asset in the hands of the shareholder; this will ordinarily be
true of any taxpayer except a dealer in securities.
2. The statute was not uniform throughout this period. Gain on partial liquidations
was taxable as ordinary income from 1934 to 1936, Revenue Act of 1934, § 115, 48 SrAT.
711, and as short-term capital gain (regardless of the holding period) from 1936 to 1942.
Revenue Act of 1936, § 115, 49 STAT. 1687. For a history of the statutory provisions, see
Darrell, Corporate Liquidations and the Federal Income Tax, 89 U. PA. L. Ray. 907 (1941).
3. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 115(g), 53 STAT. 48.
4. INsr. Rav. CODE or 1954, §§ 302(b), 346(a)(2).
5. For pre-1954 law, see Bittker & Redlich, Corporate Liquidations and the Income
Tax, 5 TAx L. REv. 437, 455 (1950); Cohen, A Technical Revision of the Federal Income
Tax Treatment of Corporate Distributions to Shareholders, 52 COLTM. L. Rav. 1, 24-38
(1952) (discussing the A.L.I. proposals); Darrell, supra note 2; Murphy, Partial Liquida-
tions and the New Look, 5 TAx L. Rav. 73 (1949); Nolan, The Uncertain Tax Treatment
of Stock Redemptions: A Legislative Proposal, 65 HARv. L. REv. 255 (1951); Pedrick,
Some Latter Day Developments in the Taxation of Liquidating Distributions, 50 MiCs. L.
Rav. 529 (1952).
For the 1954 changes, see the following, all written before the Regulations were
promulgated: Bittker, Stock Dividends, Distributions in Kind, Redemptions, and Liquida-
tions Under the 1954 Code, 1955 So. CALis. TAx INST. 349, 370; Chommie, Section 346
(a) (2): The Contraction Theory, 11 TAx L. Rav. 407 (1956); Cohen, Corporate Liquida-
tions Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 55 COLum. L. Rav. 37, 51 (1955); Cohen,
Redemptions of Stock Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 103 U. PA. L. Rav. 739
(1955); Laikin, Stock Redemptions: Sections 302 and 318, N.Y.U. 14TH INsr. oN FED.
TAx. 671 (1956); Murphy, Dividend Equivalency--The End of the Beginning?, 10 TaX L.
Rav. 213 (1955); Oberndorfer, Partial Liquidations, N.Y.U. 13TH INssr. osr Fan. TAx. 637
(1955); Owen, Stock Redemptions and Partial Liquidations Under the 1954 Code, 32
TAxEs 979 (1954); Silverstein, Stockholder Gains and Losses on Partial Liquidations,
N.Y.U. 14THs INsv. ONs FED. TAx. 707 (1956); Windhorst, Stock Redemptions and Con-
structive Ownership Problems, 33 TAxEs 917 (1955); Winton & Hoffman, A Case Study
of Stock Redemptions Under Sections 302 and 318 of the New Code, 10 TAX L. Rav. 363
(1955); Wolfman, Some of the Attribution-of-Ownership Problems Involved in the Re-
demption of Stock Under the 1954 Code, 33 TAxEs 382 (1955); Note, Redemptions and
Partial Liquidation Under the 1954 Internal Revenue Code: The Dividend Equivalence
Test, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 936 (1955).
6. Revenue Act of 1921, § 201(d), 42 STAT. 228, 229.
7. Id. at 228.
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substitute for ordinary cash dividends. Congress went on, there-
fore, to provide that the redemption of stock "after the distribution
of any such [stock] dividend" could be taxed as a dividend if the
transaction was "essentially equivalent to the distribution of a tax-
able dividend."' This provision failed to reach a redemption that
was followed, rather than preceded, by a stock dividend, but that
omission was corrected in I924.' Two years later, the provision,
which became section 115(g) of the 1939 Code,1" was amended to
apply whenever a corporation cancelled or redeemed its stock "at
such time and in such manner as to make the distribution and can-
cellation or redemption in whole or in part essentially equivalent
to the distribution of a taxable dividend," whether or not such stock
was issued as a stock dividend.1
Despite this change, the courts at one time were reluctant to
apply section 115(g) unless the redeemed shares had been issued
as tax-free stock dividends or in anticipation of a later redemption'
Later, however, the courts viewed section E15(g) more sympa-
thetically, in that they came increasingly to start with the assump-
tion that any pro rata redemption was equivalent to a taxable divi-
dend, casting on the taxpayer the burden of establishing that it
ought to be treated as a sale instead.' As section ii5(g) came to
8. Ibid.
9. Revenue Act of 1924, § 201(f), 43 SArT. 255. The statute did not provide the
Commissioner with a device to predict whether a redemption would be followed by a stock
dividend.
10. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 115(g), 53 STAT. 48.
11. Revenue Act of 1926, § 2 01(g), 44 STAT. 11.
12. Murphy, Partial Liquidations and the New Look, 5 TAX L. REv. 73 (1949).
13. See id. at 84-85. The "old" Regulations provided: "A cancellation or redemp-
tion by a corporation of a portion of its stock pro rata among all the shareholders will gen-
erally be considered as effecting a distribution essentially equivalent to a dividend ....
On the other hand, a cancellation or redemption by a corporation of all of the stock of a
particular shareholder, so that the shareholder ceases to be interested in the affairs of the
corporation, does not effect a distribution of a taxable dividend." U.S. Treas. Reg. 118,
§ 39.115 (g)-l (a) (2) (1954). For an interpretation of the phrase "ceases to be interested
in the affairs of the corporation," see Rev. Rul. 54-408, 1954-2 CuM. BULL. 165.
Although these regulations explicitly provided only that a redemption of "all" of the
stock of a particular shareholder escaped § l15(g), the position was taken that a redemp-
tion of part of the stock of a particular shareholder was equally efficacious. "It changes,
pro tanto, his interest in the corporation in the same way that redemption of all his stock
would do." Ferris v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 286, 288 (Ct. Cl. 1955). As to redemp-
tions that are superficially non-pro rata, but are pro rata in reality either because the
loss of the redeemed shares does not seriously affect the shareholder's relative position
or because he is closely related to the remaining shareholders, see Pullman, Inc., 8 T.C. 292,
297 (1947); J. C. Natwick, 36 B.T.A. 866, 876 (1937). See also note 69 infra.
While the older theory that § l15(g) was to be applied only to shares issued as stock
dividends was almost totally abandoned, a trace of it may be detected in certain cases holding
that a redemption of stock (especially preferred stock) issued for cash with an under-
standing that it would be redeemed when the corporation was financially able to do so is
not essentially equivalent to a dividend. See, e.g., Giles E. Bullock, 26 T.C. No. 35 (May
18, 1956); Marjory K. Hatch, 13 CCH TAx CT. MEm. 371 (1954); G. E. Nicholson, 17
Dec. 1956]
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be the norm by which all pro rata redemptions were tested, rather
than the exception, taxpayers found their safest escape in a judicial
doctrine that a redemption resulting from a "corporate contraction"
(or a "legitimate shrinkage") in the corporation's business activi-
ties was not essentially equivalent to a dividend.' The courts also
agreed that a redemption for "legitimate business purposes" was
not taxable under section ii5(g), without, however, agreeing on
the meaning of that phrase 5 Even less helpful was the solemn
announcement that the true test was whether the "net effect" of the
redemption was the distribution of a dividend. In its infancy, this
test was an attempt to escape an inquiry into the motives and plans
of the shareholder and his corporation." But since virtually all pro
rata redemptions have the net effect of a dividend, the courts finally
succeeded in converting this test into a restatement of the "essen-
tially equivalent" language of the statute, or, sometimes, into a
pseudonym for the "business purpose" doctrine which it was cre-
ated to avoid." In applying section ii5(g) there proved to be no
escape from an inquiry into all the facts and circumstances of each
case, and predictions were hazardous:
Above all, courts continued to look for a valid business purpose of the
corporation, such as (i) enabling the business to operate more efficiently
as a sole proprietorship or as a partnership, (2) the conduct of part of its
business under separate corporate form, (3) enhancement of its credit
rating by calling in stock to cancel stockholder indebtedness, (4) resale
T.C. 1399 (1952); Rev. Rul. 55-462, 1955-2 Cusm. BuLL. 221 The same result was reached
where the redeemed shares had been issued to pay a corporate debt. Keefe v. Cote, 213
F.2d 651 (1st Cir. 1954); Golwynne's Estate, 26 T.C. No. 151 (Sept. 28, 1956).
14. Bittker & Redlich, Corporate Liquidations and the Income Tax, 5 TAx L. REv.
437, 471-72 (1950); Chommie, Section 346(a)(2): The Contraction Theory, 11 TAx L.
REv. 407, 417-22 (1956).
15. See Bittker & Redlich, Corporate Liquidations and the Income Tax, 5 TAx L. REv.
437, 470-71 (1950).
16. Flanagan v. Helvering, 116 F.2d 937, 939-40 (D.C. Cir. 1940) ("but the net effect
of the distribution, rather than the motives and plans of the taxpayer or his corporation, is
the fundamental question in administering § 115[g]").
17. "But the courts generally have not applied the 'net effect' test with strict logic but
have broadened its scope to include inquiry into the possible existence of some 'legitimate
business purpose,' for the redemption, that is to say, a legitimate corporate purpose as dis-
tinguished from a purpose to benefit the stockholder by a distribution of accumulated earn-
ings and profits exempt from the imposition of income tax . . . , thus adding a question
of motive to the question of ultimate result." Keefe v. Cote, 213 F.2d 651, 657 (1st Cir.
1954). The wheel came full circle in Golwynne's Estate, 26 T.C. No. 151 (Sept 28, 1956).
"Since Flanagan v. Helvering . . . the courts have relied repeatedly on the so-called net
effect test to determine the factual question here presented. That is to say, if the 'net effect'
of a stock redemption and distribution is essentially equivalent to a dividend distribution,
then it is so taxed; if not, if a legitimate business purpose prompted the redemption and
distribution, then it is not taxable as a dividend." Ibid. In Commissioner v. Sullivan, 210
F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1954), on the other hand, Judge Holmes wrote: "The net-effect test is
not a test but an attractive abbreviation of the statute .... " Id. at 609.
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of stock to junior executives, (5) provision of a profitable investment for
an employees' association, (6) adjustment for a legitimate shrinkage of
the business following a fire causing a permanent reduction in productive
capacity, (7) elimination of unprofitable departments, or (8) contempla-
tion of ultimate liquidation.
Other factors than business purpose entered into the witch's brew.
While the pro-rata feature is seldom disregarded and often held control-
ling, its effect is not always predictable and courts at times find no divi-
dend, though the redemption is pro-rata and upon occasion even find
that a nonpro-rata distribution requires dividend treatment. Other
factors of varying degrees of significance have been held to be a poor
dividend record, combined with large available earnings or profits; the
fact that the initiative for the distribution was taken by the shareholder,
rather than by the corporation; and the fact that the consideration paid
for the redeemed stock bears no relation to its value, book or otherwise.'
8
Before 1954 the statute did not distinguish between "redemp-
tions" and "partial liquidations"; in fact, the term "partial liquida-
tion" was defined as "a distribution by a corporation in complete
cancellation or redemption of a part of its stock."'" This, the drafts-
men of the 1954 Code thought, led to confusion:
Existing law is complicated by the fact that stock redemptions are
included within the terms of the partial liquidation provisions. Thus, a
redemption of all of the stock of i of 2 sole shareholders of a corporation
may result in capital-gain treatment to the redeemed shareholder. The
result occurs, however, not by reason of the use of any particular assets
of the corporation to effect the redemption but because the distribution
when viewed at the shareholder level is so disproportionate with respect
to the outstanding shareholder interests as not to be substantially equiva-
lent to a dividend.
Your committee, as did the House bill, separates into their significant
elements the kind of transactions now incoherently aggregated in the
definition of a partial liquidation. Those distributions which may have
capital-gain characteristics because they are not made pro rata among the
various shareholders would be subjected, at the shareholder level, to the
separate tests described in part I of this subchapter. On the other hand,
those distributions characterized by what happens solely at the corporate
level by reason of the assets distributed would be included as within the
concept of a partial liquidation."
18. Treusch, Corporate Distributions and Adjustments: Recent Case Reminders of
Some Old Problems Under the New Code, 32 TAxas 1023, 1037 (1954). For cases in which
the applicability of § 115(g) was submitted to a jury, see Jones v. Griffin, 216 F.2d 885
(10th Cir. 1954); Keefe v. Cote, 213 F.2d 651 (1st Cir. 1954).
19. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 115(i), 53 STAT. 48. The definition (which strictly
speaking was a definition of the term "amounts distributed in partial liquidation") also
embraced "one of a series of distributions in complete cancellation or redemption of all or
a portion of its stock."
20. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1954) [hereinafter cited as SNtAT
REPORT].
Dec. 1956]
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The language of the 1954 Code, however, fails hopelessly in its
aim of separating partial liquidations from redemptions. Accord-
ing to section 346(a), a partial liquidation (which is to be treated
like a sale of the surrendered stock) includes a distribution "in
redemption of a part of the stock of the corporation" that is "not
essentially equivalent to a dividend." Nothing is said in section
346(a) about distributions characterized by what happens solely
at the corporate level or about corporate contractions. Yet section
346 is the section that is supposed to provide the exclusive rule for
partial liquidations, segregating them from other redemptions.
Not only is section 346(a) innocent of any reference to corporate
contractions, but its language is virtually identical with parts of
section 302, the section designed by the draftsmen of the 3954
Code to deal exclusively with those redemptions that are not par-
tial liquidations. For section 302 provides, among other things,
that a redemption shall be treated as a sale of the stock if it "is not
essentially equivalent to a dividend." If the draftsmen's goal of
separating into their significant elements the kind of transactions
incoherently aggregated by the 1939 Code in the definition of a
partial liquidation is achieved, it will be by the painful process of
administrative and judicial construction of muddy language.
Moreover, whatever simplicity is gained by the new statutory
framework is easily outweighed by the complications introduced
by the distinction between "distributions characterized by what
happens solely at the corporate level by reason of the assets distrib-
uted" (i.e., partial liquidations) and "distributions which may have
capital-gain characteristics because they are not made pro rata
among the various shareholders" (i.e., certain other redemp-
tions). 1 To determine whether a redemption of stock is to be
treated as a sale or as a dividend under the 1954 Code, it often will
be necessary to examine section 302, relating to ordinary redemp-
tions, as well as sections 331(a)(2) and 346, relating to partial
liquidations.22 The following discussion will deal first with the
21. Ibid.
22. In the opinion of the author, the transfer of stock by a shareholder to his corpora-
tion for consideration can qualify as a sale or exchange of a capital asset only if it meets the
standards of § 302(a), § 331(a)(2) or § 303. I do not believe, in other words, that
such a transaction between the shareholder and his corporation can qualify for capital gain
or loss treatment on the independent ground that it is a sale of stock rather than a redemp-
tion and that only the latter category must run the gauntlet of § 302(a), § 331(a) (2)
and § 346, as is suggested by one writer. Chommie, Section 346(a) (2): The Contraction
Theory, 11 TAx L. Rav. 407, 415-16 (1956). At one time, to be sure, the courts distin-
guished between the proceeds of a partial liquidation and the proceeds of a sale of stock to
[Vol. 9: Page 13
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partial liquidation testea and then will treat stock redemptions.
Finally, attention will be given to collateral problems.
the issuing corporation. The distinction was created during the period when gains on partial
liquidations were treated as ordinary income (1934-36) or as short-term capital gain (1936-
42). See note 2 supra. If the shareholder could persuade the court that he had sold his
shares to the corporation, rather than surrendered them in a partial liquidation, his gain
would be long-term capital gain (assuming the shares had been held for the appropriate
period of time), rather than ordinary income or short-term capital gain. Since the term
"partial liquidation" was defined in § 115(g) of the 1939 Code to mean "a distribution
by a corporation in . . . cancellation or redemption" of stock, some courts held that a
transaction constituted a sale rather than a partial liquidation if the shares were held in the
treasury and not cancelled or retired. See cases cited note 53 infra.
Another criterion for distinguishing between sale and partial liquidation was whether
the corporation was winding up or permanently reducing its assets; if not, and especially
if the shares were to be reissued, there was a tendency to hold that the transaction was a
sale of shares to the corporation rather than a partial liquidation. Bittker, Stock Dividends,
Distributions in Kind, Redemptions, and Liquidations Under the 1954 Code, 1955 So.
CALlp. TAx Isr. 349, 458-65; Kaufman, How to Treat Stock Redemptions, N.Y.U. 9TrH
INST. Ocr FED. TAx. 1007, 1009-12 (1951). The distinction declined in importance after
1942, when partial liquidations became entitled to long-term capital gain treatment once
more. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 115, as amended, 56 STAT. 841 (1942). However, it
lingered on, since a transaction that could be characterized as a sale did not have to with-
stand the test of § 115(g). Another application of the distinction is to be found in Bernard
Rubin, 5 CCH Tax Ct. Meren. 216 (1946), where a loss on a transfer of stock by a share-
holder to a controlled corporation was disallowed because the transaction was a sale rather
than a liquidation under what is now § 267.
Under subchapter C of the 1954 Code, however, it is doubtful that the category of sale
still exists as an independent category of transactions between the shareholder and his cor-
poration. Section 317(b) provides that "stock shall be treated as redeemed by a corporation
if the corporation acquires its stock from a shareholder in exchange for property, whether
or not the stock so acquired is cancelled, retired, or held as treasury stock." This definition
obliterates the distinction between stock that is cancelled or retired and stock that is held
in the treasury at least for purposes of part I of subchapter C. It also seems to embrace all
transactions by which the corporation acquires stock from its shareholders for consideration,
leaving no room for a sale of stock to the corporation. This conclusion is reinforced by the
fact that § 302(b) (1) was enacted partly to deal with isolated transactions that, before
1954, would have been regarded as sales. See pp. 41-45 inIra.
Moreover, it was thought by some observers that the 1939 Code lent color to the dis-
tinction between sale and p~artial liquidation by using the term "distributions" in reference
to the latter. It was argued that a distribution contemplates "a ratable, permanent transfer"
of assets to the shareholders, to be distinguished from a purchase of stock by the corporation
for resale. Kaufman, supra at 1009. The 1954 Code retains the phrase "distributed" in
§ 331(a)(2) and in § 346, but § 317(b), as indicated above, provides that if a cor-
poration "acquires its stock from a shareholder in exchange for property" it "shall be
treated as redeemed," and § 302(a) and § 302(d) provide that a redemption "shall be
treated as a distribution." The colorless language of § 317(b) thus seems clearly to
embrace any acquisition of stock for a consideration, whether the transaction would have
been a "distribution" under the pre-1954 criteria or not.
A special, but minor, problem is presented by a transaction in which a shareholder
buys property from his corporation and pays for it in stock. From the corporation's point
of view, this is a sale of the property on which gain or loss is recognized rather than a
distribution under § 311(a). See note 164 infra. But from the point of view of the
shareholder, the stock has probably been redeemed within the meaning of § 317(b).
23. The Regulations take the position that if a distribution qualifies under § 346
as a partial liquidation, § 302 is not applicable to it. T.D. 6152, 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.346-2,
1.302-1(a) (1955). Often it will be immaterial to the shareholder which section is em-
ployed, assuming his distribution qualifies under both § 346 and § 302(a), but § 346
will be preferable if section 306 stock is redeemed under § 306(b) (2) or if LIFO in-
ventory or property subject to a liability is distributed. See Chommie, Section 346(a)(2):
The Contraction Theory, 11 TAx L. Rav. 407, 413-14 (1956). See also pp. 58-59 infra.
Moreover, § 267, which disallows losses on certain "sales or exchanges of property,"
does not apply to "distributions in corporate liquidations." This exemption formerly em-
HeinOnline -- 9 Stan. L. Rev. 19 1956-1957
20 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9: Page 13
I. PAlun& LIQUIDATIONS
Section 331 (a) (2) provides that amounts distributed in partial
liquidation of a corporation shall be treated as payment in ex-
change for the stock. If the stock is a capital asset in the hands of
the shareholder, which is normally the case, his gain or loss (the
difference between the value of the distribution and the adjusted
basis of the redeemed stock) 4 will be capital gain or loss, long- or
short-term depending upon his holding period for the stock. While
section 331 (a) (2) is the operative provision, requiring the distribu-
tion in partial liquidation to be treated like the proceeds of a sale
of the stock, it is dependent upon section 346, which defines the
term "partial liquidation." 5 Section 346 provides that a distribution
"shall be treated as in partial liquidation" of a corporation if it falls
into one of three categories:26
i) A distribution that is one of a series of distributions in com-
plete liquidation of the corporation. 2' This category of partial
liquidations could have been classed with complete liquidations;
it does not invoke the "corporate contraction" concept that is ordi-
narily associated with the term "partial liquidation."
2) A distribution in redemption of part of the stock of a cor-
poration that is "not essentially equivalent to a dividend."28 This
category of partial liquidations is "characterized by what happens
solely at the corporate level by reason of the assets distributed,' 2"
i.e., it is a statutory adoption of the "corporate contraction" concept
created by the courts under the 1939 Code.
braced redemptions of stock whether there was a corporate contraction or not, but because
of the more limited scope of the term "partial liquidation" under the 1954 Code, it may be
that the exemption no longer applies to § 302(a) redemptions. See p. 53 infra. On the
other hand, the punitive treatment of collapsible corporations applies to distributions
in partial liquidation, but possibly not to § 302(a) redemptions. T.D. 6152, 26 C.F.R.
§ 1.341-1 (1955), refers to gain from the "actual" sale or exchange of stock of a col-
lapsible corporation, permitting the inference that a § 302(a) redemption is not reached
by § 341(a)(1).
See T.D. 6152, 26 C.F.R. § 1.302-1(b) (1955) as to "excess" distributions in con-
nection with partial liquidations.
24. For problems in determining the adjusted basis of the redeemed stock, see pp.
51-53 infra.
25. Although § 346 is captioned as defining partial liquidation, strictly speaking
it simply provides that a distribution "shall be treated as in partial liquidation" under stated
circumstances. However, the Regulations state: "This section [§ 346] defines a partial
liquidation." T.M. 6152, 26 C.F.R. § 1.346-1(a) (1955).
26. See Chommie, supra note 23; Oberndorfer, Partial Liquidations, N.Y.U. 13nT
INsT, ox FED. TAX. 637 (1955); Silverstein, Stockholder Gains and Losses on Partial
Liquidations, N.Y.U. 14TH INsr. N FuD. TAx. 707 (1956).
27. INr. Rav. CoDE oF 1954, § 346(a)(1).
28. Id. § 346(a) (2).
29. SENATE REPoRT 49, quoted at p. 17 supra.
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3) A distribution that terminates one of two or more active
businesses engaged in by the distributing corporation ° This cate-
gory of partial liquidations was created by the 1954 Code; it is a
type of corporate contraction that is ipso facto to be treated as a
partial liquidation, without reference to the vague criteria of the
corporate contraction concept.
These three categories of partial liquidations will be dealt with
in turn.
r. One of a Series of Distributions in Complete Liquidation:
Section 346(a)(i)
Section 346(a) (i) provides that a distribution shall be treated
as a partial liquidation of a corporation if it is one of a series of
distributions in redemption of all of the stock of the corporation
pursuant to a plan. The relationship of this provision to section
331 (a) (i), providing that amounts distributed in complete liquida-
tion of a corporation shall be treated like the proceeds of a sale of
the stock, is not clear. If a complete liquidation is consummated by
a series of interim distributions without the surrender of any stock
until the final distribution is made, the shareholder applies the dis-
tributions against the total basis of his stock and recognizes gain
only when his basis for all the shares has been fully recovered 1
The problem of reconciling sections 346(a) and 331 (a) (i) arises
if each interim distribution in the process of complete liquidation
is accompanied by a redemption of an appropriate number of
shares. There is authority for treating such a series of distributions
as the equivalent of a complete liquidation, so that gain would be
recognized only when the shareholder's total basis for all his shares
had been recovered3 2 Another approach, however, would be to
30. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 346(b).
31. Arthur Lets, 30 B.T.A. 800 (1934), affd on other grounds, 84 F.2d 760 (9th
Cir. 1936). Unlike gain, loss is computed and recognized only when the final distribution
is received, unless the amount of the loss can be accurately determined at an earlier time.
Commissioner v. Winthrop, 98 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1938); G.C.M. 21966, 1940-1 Cum.
Bu .. 130. According to Norman Cooledge, 40 B.T.A. 110 (1939), gain or loss is to be
computed separately on each block of stock held by the shareholder, rather than on the
aggregate basis of all shares, so that both long- and short-term gains and losses may be
realized on the liquidation.
32. See Florence M. Quinn, 35 B.T.A. 412 (1937), rejecting "the idea that in a con-
tinued process of complete liquidation a single distribution, which may if isolated answer
the statutory description of a 'partial liquidation,' may be separately treated." Id. at 414.
The effect of the Quinn case, according to Karl G. Von Platen, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 657
(1953), is that "a corporate distribution made in the process of a complete liquidation
must be applied against the aggregate basis of all the stockholder's shares, notwithstanding
Dec. 1956 ]
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treat each partial liquidation as a separate transaction, computing
gain or loss each time by subtracting the basis of the redeemed
shares from the value of the interim distribution.2'
2. Distribution Not Essentially Equivalent to a Dividend:
Section 346(a)(2)
A distribution is to be treated as in partial liquidation of a cor-
poration under section 346(a) (2) if it (a) "is not essentially equiva-
lent to a dividend," (b) is in redemption of a part of the stock of
the corporation pursuant to a plan and (c) occurs within the tax-
able year in which the plan is adopted or within the succeeding
taxable year. The first of these requirements invokes the "corpo-
rate contraction" doctrine and poses some troublesome problems;
the second and third requirements are formal in nature and should
ordinarily be easily satisfied.
a) Equivalence to a Dividend. The language of this part of
section 346(a) (2) echoes the phraseology of section "5(g) of the
1939 Code, 4 though it is somewhat less elaborate. It clearly carries
his contemporaneous surrender of some of his shares in connection with the distribution."
Id. at 660.
A combination of the theory of the Quinn case with the theory of Norman Cool-
edge, supra note 31, raises some problems. Assume A owns all the stock of Corporation X,
one block of 50 shares having been acquired in 1954 at a total cost of $50,000 and another
block of 50 having been acquired in June 1955, at a total cost of $10,000. The corporation
adopts a plan of complete liquidation in October 1955, distributes $80,000 to A at that
time in exchange for 40 shares of stock (20 from each block) and makes a final distribu-
tion of $120,000 in 1956 in exchange for the 60 remaining shares. Under the Quinn case,
$20,000 of gain would be recognized in 1955, i.e., the excess of the total amount received
in 1955 ($80,000) over the aggregate basis for the 100 shares ($60,000), and $120,000 of
gain would be recognized in 1956. But if the approach of the Cooledge case were adopted,
the 1955 distribution would produce a long-term gain of $20,000 ($40,000 received for
20 shares of 1954 stock costing $20,000) and a short-term gain of $36,000 ($40,000 re-
ceived for 20 shares of 1955 stock costing $4,000), while the 1956 distribution would
produce a long-term gain of $84,000 ($120,000 received for 30 shares of 1954 stock costing
$30,000 and 30 shares of 1955 stock costing $6,000).
Under the Quinn case, it is necessary to determine when a partial liquidation is only
a step toward a complete liquidation and when it stands on its own feet as a separate trans-
action. See National Investors Corp. v. Hoey, 52 F. Supp. 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), revd,
144 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1944); Karl Von Platen, supra; T. T. Word Supply Co., 41 B.T.A.
965, 980 (1940); John B. Williams, 28 B.T.A. 1279 (1933). Partial liquidations falling
into the latter category could claim capital gain or loss treatment, under the 1954 Code,
only if they qualify under § 346(a) (2).
33. In Courtenay D. Allington, 31 B.T.A. 421 (1934), a partial liquidation that,
according to the findings of facts, was a step in a complete liquidation, was treated as a
separate transaction for computation of gain. The only issue discussed by the court was
whether the basis of the shares surrendered at the time of the first liquidating distribution
should be computed under the "first-in-first-out" rule of the Regulations. But the compu-
tations in the findings of fact show that the Quinn rule, requiting the distribution to be
applied first against the shareholder's total basis for all his shares, was not followed. See
also National Investors Corp. v. Hoey, supra note 32; J. Paul McDaniel, 25 T.C. 276
(1955); Estate of Charles Fearon, 16 T.C. 385 (1951); Friedman, Points to Be Considered
in Liquidating a Corporation, N.Y.U. 5TH INst. o N FED. TAx. 747, 764-72 (1947).
34. See pp. 14-15 supra.
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forward to some degree the "corporate contraction" doctrine that
was developed under old section ii5(g). But what is less clear is
whether section 346(a) (2) can be satisfied only by distributions
resulting from corporate contractions. The statute itself sheds no
light on the subject. The Senate Report at one point flatly implies
that section 346(a) is concerned only with redemptions that "ter-
minate a part of the business of the corporation,"35 though at other
points it seems to regard corporate contractions as the principal, but
not necessarily the sole, instance of partial liquidation 6 The em-
phasis on the nature of the assets distributed, as a test of partial
liquidation," leaves little room for distributions that do not result
from corporate contractions, since only in the case of corporate con-
tractions has it been thought that the nature of the distributed
assets was an important element in determining whether the dis-
tribution was essentially equivalent to a dividend. It is not likely,
therefore, that section 346(a) (2) will be satisfied by distributions
that do not reflect a corporate contraction.s
According to the Senate Report, the definition of partial liqui-
dation of the 1954 Code primarily "involves the concept of 'corpo-
rate contraction' as developed under existing law."39 At another
point the Report states:
The general language of the proposed draft would include within the
definition of a partial liquidation the type of cases involving the contrac-
tion of the corporate business. Such as for example, cases which hold
that if the entire floor of a factory is destroyed by fire, the insurance pro-
ceeds received may be distributed pro rata to the shareholders without the
imposition of a tax at the rates applicable to the distribution of a dividend,
if the corporation no longer continues its operations to the same extent
maintained by the destroyed facility. Voluntary bona fide contraction of
35. SEATE REPoRT 255. In referring to § 306(b) (2), the Senate Report states: "In
the case of a partial liquidation your committee contemplates a contraction of the corporate
business . I..." d  at 243.
36. "Primarily, this definition [§ 3 4 6(a)] involves the concept of 'corporate con-
traction' as developed under existing law." Id. at 262. See also id. at 49, quoted at p. 17
infra.
37. Ibid.
38. One commentator argues that one of the most convincing arguments against lim-
iting § 3 4 6 (a) (2) to corporate contractions is the use of the term "primarily" in the state-
ment in the Senate Report, quoted in note 36 supra. Chommie, Section 346(a) (2): The
Contraction Theory, 11 TAx L. REv. 407, 426 (1956). But the phrase "primarily" refers
to the entire definition of § 346(a), not merely to that part in § 346(a)(2). The "sec-
ondary implication" which Chommie seeks could very well be the type of partial liqui-
dation defined by § 346(a)(1), leaving corporate contractions as the sole basis for applying
§ 346(a) (2). Another writer takes a more liberal view of the scope of § 346(a) (2),
though recognizing that the Senate Report is less liberal than he. Cohen, Redemptions of
Stoc k Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 103 U. PA. L. Rnv. 739, 768-69 (1955),
39. SENAEr REPoat 262.
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the corporate business may of course also qualify to the same extent as
under existing law.40
The corporate contraction doctrine under the 1939 Code embraced
not only the overworked destruction-by-fire case,41 but others where
the reason for capital gain or loss treatment was even more ob-
scure 2 Redemptions because a reserve for expansion was no longer
40. Ibid.
41. Joseph Imler, 11 T.C. 836 (1948).
42. The author has previously expressed his belief that the "corporate contraction"
standard is not a legitimate test for determining whether a redemption is substantially
equivalent to a dividend:
'Even if one assumes that a 'business purpose' test has a proper place in the in-
terpretation of section 115(g), it is highly questionable that the standard of 'legitimate
shrinkage' has any economic validity. Courts are impressed with the discontinuance
of a part of the business. But what if we have a business which has accumulated a
surplus in expectation of an expansion which, for some reason, never occurs? When
this corporation distributes the surplus, the stockholders probably will not be pro-
tected by the shield of legitimate shrinkage. But in both cases the economic decision
made by the directors was essentially the same. They decided that capital was no
longer required for the needs of the business and could be distributed among the
stockholders through a redemption of capital stock. In one instance the capital had
been used for an activity that was being curtailed. In the other, it was capital that
had been saved for an activity which never took place. It is hard to understand why
one distribution represents a more 'legitimate shrinkage' than the other or exhibits a
more valid business purpose.
"And the 'legitimate shrinkage' concept becomes more meaningless when viewed
as a standard of taxation under section 115(g). That section is concerned with taxing
distributions that are 'essentially equivalent' to dividends. No stockholder can escape
paying a tax under section 115(a), the section which defines dividends, because the
distribution represented a 'legitimate shrinkage' of the corporation's activities. A
distribution is a dividend under section 115(a) when earnings and profits are separated
from the corporation and distributed to the shareholders without altering their relative
ownership interests. If the same result is achieved as a result of a redemption of stock,
it should be taxed as a dividend. Obviously, if we are looking to see whether there
has been a distribution of assets without a change in proportionate ownership, it is
immaterial whether the distribution was caused by a legitimate shrinkage or by
boom-year profits."
Bittker & Redlich, Corporate Liquidations and the Income Tax, 5 T.,x L. Rav. 437, 472-73
(1950).
"It is very doubtful if the contours of a contraction test can be prescribed with
any measure of success. But even if we assume that we can define 'contraction,' what
is its relevance? By hypothesis the corporation has accumulated profits and is dis-
tributing cash representing some of these profits. The corporation does not intend to
conclude its existence, for the distribution is not one of a series of distributions in
complete liquidation of the corporation. The shareholders remain as shareholders,
their initial investment is still intact, and their relationships to the corporation and
each other have not been altered. In such a setting, the distribution of cash should
be treated for what it is--a distribution of profits. The activity at the corporate level
which produced the cash and the motivation behind its distribution are not matters
which should affect this conclusion.
"In this regard, we should not be moved by the emotional case in which cash
results from an 'involuntary conversion' of a part of a business, as where a branch
activity is destroyed by fire and instead of rebuilding the activity the corporation
distributes the insurance proceeds. Such proceeds are simply cash profits being dis-
tributed. The fire unexpectedly forced the directors to make a decision involving the
cessation of the activity. An unexpected but tempting offer to purchase the activity
equally would have prompted a directors' meeting.
"We may also dismiss the argument based on rewriting history-vrz., the corpo-
ration originally could have been two corporations, each operating a part of the busi-
[VOL. 9: Page 13
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required, or because a shift in the scale or nature of the corpora-
tion's operations had caused a decline in its need for working cap-
ital, or because property was being distributed to protect it from
the claims of corporate creditors or because an unprofitable depart-
ment had been liquidated-all have sometimes successfully claimed
the mantle of corporate contraction. 3 It may be going too far to say
that under the 1939 Code the royal road to capital gain treatment
for cash distributions to shareholders was to find some immediate
or potential corporate use for its earnings and profits and wait for
a plausible excuse for abandoning that use, but the cases were grad-
ually beating at least a rough trail for astute taxpayers to follow."
ness, so that a later sale of the assets of one of the corporations would have resulted
in its complete liquidation and hence capital gain treatment. Usually the business of
a corporation simply expands out of accumulated earnings, a pattern which does not
permit the separate incorporation hypothesis. Moreover, even if the situation would
have accommodated two corporations at the outset, the shareholders did choose a differ-
ent route. And the activities of a single corporation over the years are different from
the relationships and activities of several corporations over the same period of time.
There is, therefore, no justification for discovering hypothetical twins at the last
minute."
Cohen, A Technical Revision of the Federal Income Tax Treatment of Corporate Distribu-
tions to Shareholders, 52 CoLUm. L. REv. 1, 37-38 (1952).
43. Reserves for expansion: Commissioner v. Champion, 78 F.2d 513 (6th Cir. 1935);
S. A. Upham, 4 T.C. 1120 (1945). Contra: McGuire v. Commissioner, 84 F.2d 431 (7th
Cir. 1936). Decline in working capital needs: Commissioner v. Quackenbos, 78 F.2d 156
(2d Cir. 1935); Clarence R. O'Brion, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Memn. 1122 (1951); Edwin L.
Jones, P-H 1942 T.C. Mem. Dec. 51373; John P. Elton, 47 B.T.A. 111 (1942). Contra:
Dunton v. Clauson, 67 F. Supp. 839 (S.D. Me. 1946). Protection against creditors: Com-
missioner v. Sullivan, 210 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1954); see also L. M. Lockhart, 8 T.C. 436
(1947). Liquidation of department: Commissioner v. Babson, 70 F.2d 304 (7th Cir.
1934); Heber Scowcroft Inv. Co., 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 755 (1945).
Because the courts rarely if ever find it necessary to base a decision on a single factor,
it cannot be said with assurance that the element of contraction was the sole foundation
for any of the foregoing decisions, though it appears to have been at least persuasive, if
not the turning point, in all. It is entirely possible, however, that some of the earlier
cases would not pass the more rigorous judicial examination that has been common re-
cently. See Chommie, supra note 38, at 418.
44. See the warning in Edward L. Kraus, 6 T.C. 105 (1946), involving a manufac-
turing company which sold a portfolio of securities and redeemed some of its stock with
the proceeds.
"The argument is made that an investment business was conducted ... to sup-
port the contention that there was a partial liquidation of the company when the
securities were sold. But the liquidation of assets of the character we have here does
not necessarily result in a liquidation of a 'business,' nor does the fact that the $150,-
000 which was distributed was most of the proceeds from the sale of securities stamp
them as liquidating distributions.. . . If the securities represented the investment
of accumulated profits, as we are compelled to conclude, the sales of the securities in
1940 operated to return to the company a fund of accumulated profits."
Id. at 120-21. See also Hyman v. Helvering, 71 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1934).
"And so also if a corporation invests earnings in plant and equipment, which, in later
years, in a policy of contraction of business activities, it decides to sell and to divide
the proceeds among its shareholders, the distribution is none the less a dividend,
though the device of cancelling some of the outstanding shares be adopted as a
method of accomplishing the end sought."
Id. at 344.
These cases are extreme instances of judicial alertness to abuse of the corporate con-
traction doctrine, and it cannot be said that they reflect the customary attitude in this area.
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Notwithstanding several references to existing law, the drafts-
men of section 346(a) (2) gave at least two indications that the pre-
1954 law of corporate contractions was not ratified in every respect.
The Senate Report states flatly that "a distribution of a reserve for
expansion is not a partial liquidation,"'45 thus rejecting at least some
pre-i954 cases. 6 Moreover, the almost equally clear implication
that section 346(a) (2) applies only to redemptions that "terminate
a part of the business of the corporation '" is not compatible with
pre-I954 cases holding that a distribution of excess working capital
can qualify as a partial liquidation. 8 Even in the absence of these
inconsistencies between the Senate Report and pre-I954 law, it
would be improper to interpret a general intention to carry forward
existing law as either a blanket endorsement of every judicial deci-
sion theretofore rendered or as preventing further evolutionary
developments in what is at best an imprecise concept imposed upon
very divergent sets of facts. In this connection, it is worthy of note
that the case of Joseph W. Imler," explicitly described and ap-
proved by the Senate Report," states:
The issue here raised presents a question of fact depending on the
circumstances of the particular case.... No sole or universally appli-
cable test can be laid down. . . .Though decided cases are not control-
ling, they are helpful as indicating what elements have been considered
important, viz., the presence or absence of a real business purpose, the
motives of the corporation at the time of distribution, the size of the cor-
porate surplus, the past dividend policy, and the presence of any special
circumstance relating to the distribution.51
The existence of conflicting decisions and inconsistent ap-
proaches in the pre-I954 case law makes judicial choices in the
future unavoidable. The "corporate contraction" doctrine, then
must be viewed as an organic concept, not as a frozen body of
rules5
45. SENATE REPoRT 262. See T.D. 6152, 26 C.F.R. § 1.346-1(a) (1955).
46. Commissioner v. Champion, 78 F.2d 513 (6th Cir. 1935); Samuel A. Upham,
4 T.C. 1120 (1945).
47. SENATE REPORT 225, 243.
48. Commissioner v. Quackenbos, 78 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1935); Clarence R. O'Brion,
10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1122 (1951); Edwin L. Jones, P-H 1942 T.C. Mem. Dec. 151373;
John P. Elton, 47 B.T.A. 111 (1942).
49. 11 T.C. 836 (1948).
50. SENATE REPoRT 262.
51. Joseph W. Imler, 11 T.C. 836, 840 (1948). For other examples, see Estate of
Charles D. Chandler, 22 T.C. 1158, 1166 (1954) ("a contraction of business per se does not
render section 115[g] inapplicable"); L. M. Lockhart, 8 T.C. 436 (1947).
52. See Chommie, Section 346(a) (2): The Contraction Theory, 11 TAx L. Ry. 407,
418 (1956), reviewing many cases and pointing out that some of the earlier corporate
contraction cases might have been decided differently had they come up in recent years.
[VOL. 9: Page 13
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b) Redemption Pursuant to a Plan. Section 346(a) (2) re-
quires a "redemption" of stock. Under the pre-i954 law, some
courts held that reacquired stock that was held in the treasury had
not been "cancelled or redeemed." 3 Section 3 7 (b) defines "re-
demption" as a reacquisition of stock by a corporation from a share-
holder in exchange for property, whether the stock is thereafter
cancelled, retired or held as treasury stock. This definition, which
prevents form from triumphing over substance, does not techni-
cally apply to section 346, though probably this was an over-
sight.
5'
Another problem in this area is whether a distribution ac-
companying a reduction in the par or stated value of stock con-
stitutes a redemption, even though no stock is surrendered by the
shareholders. The proposed Regulations stated that such a dis-
tribution is a redemption,s but this announcement was omitted
from the final Regulations. Such a distribution was not equivalent
to a redemption under the 1939 Code," and nothing in the 1954
Code suggests that a different rule should be applied in the future."
Section 346(a) requires a redemption "pursuant to a plan." The
term "plan" is not defined in either the Code or the Regulations.
No doubt an informal plan will suffice, as in other areas where a
53. Commissioner v. Snite, 177 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1949); Alpers v. Commissioner,
126 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1942). Contra: Keefe v. Cote, 213 F.2d 651 (1st Cir. 1954); Wall
v. United States, 164 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1947). Dictum contra, Smith v. United States, 131
CL Cl. 748, 130 F. Supp. 586 (1955). An intermediate position, treating treasury shares
as cancelled or redeemed where there was no intention to reissue them, was apparently
approved in Boyle v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d 557 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 817
(1951).
54. Since the definition in § 317(b) is "for purposes of this part," technically it
applies only to part I of the subchapter. Section 346 is in part II. It is possible that the
Commissioner would argue that holding reacquired shares in the treasury, at least if they
were to be reissued soon, is inconsistent with a claimed corporate contraction. If stock
held in the treasury has not been "redeemed," the transaction could not claim the protec-
tion of § 331(a) (2). It would then have to be tested by the standards of § 302, under
which the corporate contraction would be irrelevant
55. Proposed Regulations, § 1.317-2, 19 FED. REG. 8254 (1954).
56. Sheehan v. Dana, 163 F.2d 316, 173 AL.R. 684 (8th Cir. 1947); Beretta v.
Commissioner, 141 F.2d 452 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 720 (1944).
What if a corporation that could engage in a corporate contraction under § 346(a) (2)
by redeeming pare of its stock chooses to distribute the unwanted assets in two steps, the
first distribution being in reduction of the par value of one class of stock, and the second
distribution being in redemption of the same class? Under the 1939 Code the first dis-
tribution, as well as the second, might have qualified as a partial liquidation, on the ground
that it was "one of a series of distributions in complete cancellation or redemption of all or
a portion of its stock." Int. Rev. Code of 1939 § 115(i), 53 STAT. 48. [Emphasis added.]
See R. D. Merrill Co., 4 T.C. 955, 967-68 (1945). But the 1954 Code does not lend itself
so easily to the same interpretation. Section 346(a) (1) permits a complete liquidation to
be effected by a series of interim distributions, but § 346(a) (2) seems to contemplate that
each distribution in the process of partial liquidation will be accompanied by a redemption
of stock.
57. See Sa&;AT' REPoRT 252.
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corporate adjustment must occur under a plan, but careful counsel
will not trust to luck.
c) Distribution in the Year the Plan Is Adopted or Within the
Succeeding Year. Since neither the Code nor the Regulations de-
fines the term "plan," it is not surprising that neither states how
the time of its adoption should be determined. No doubt the time
will ordinarily begin to run from the formal action by the share-
holders authorizing the redemption, but the Commissioner might
be justified on occasion in determining that the plan was adopted
by informal action at an earlier date and in disqualifying a dis-
tribution as too late under section 346(a) (2)."8
3. Termination of a Business: Section 34 6(b)
The shareholders need not concern themselves with the vagaries
of the "corporate contraction" concept if the distribution meets
the requirements of section 346(b), relating to a distribution in
termination of an active business by a corporation that is engaged
in two or more active businesses.59 This provision has no counter-
part in the 1939 Code. To qualify under section 346(b), the fol-
lowing requirements must be met:
i) The distribution must be attributable to the corporation's
ceasing to conduct, or must consist of the assets of, a trade or busi-
ness;
2) Immediately after the distribution, the distributing corpo-
ration must be actively engaged in a trade or business;
3) Both the retained trade or business and the one that was
distributed (or that gave rise to the distribution) must have been
actively conducted (though not necessarily by the distributing cor-
58. See T.D. 6152, 26 C.F.R. § 1.337-2(b) (1955).
59. "[Section 346] (b) provides a description of one kind of distribution which will
be considered as being in partial liquidation. Paragraphs (1) and (2) contemplate
that the distributing corporation must be engaged in the active conduct of at least 2
businesses which have been actively conducted (whether or not by it) for the 5-year
period ending on the date of the distribution. Neither of such businesses may have
been acquired within such period in a transaction in which gain or loss was recognized
in whole or in part. Thus, a qualifying business may not have been acquired by pur-
chase or a corporate reorganization where so-called 'boot' was present. If these re-
quirements are met, one of the active businesses may be distributed in kind (or the
proceeds of sale of such a business may be distributed) as long as the corporation
immediately after the distribution is engaged in the active conduct of a business as
described above. The determination of whether the requirements of subsection (b)
[of § 346] have been met shall be made without regard to whether the distribution
is pro rata among the shareholders of the corporation."
SENATE RFPoRT 262.
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poration) throughout the five-year period before the distribution;
and
4) Neither of the trades or businesses may have been acquired
by the distributing corporation within the five-year period in a
transaction in which gain or loss was recognized in whole or in
part.
This battery of requirements may be understood more easily
if their purpose is known. Accepting the "corporate contraction"
doctrine as an appropriate test, the draftsmen wanted to create an
area in which capital gains treatment would be assured without
the necessity of justifying each distribution, case by case, under the
vague standards of the courts.6" They thought that if a corporation
with two or more businesses wished to distribute one of them, the
distribution should be treated as a partial liquidation. At the same
time, they did not want to open an easy route to tax avoidance, and
they recognized the possibility that a closely held corporation could
accumulate its earnings and profits, invest its surplus cash in assets
that the shareholders would like to hold as individuals, and then
go through the form of a corporate contraction by distributing the
newly acquired assets and retaining the business assets."' The re-
quirement in section 346(b) of active conduct of a trade or business
will prevent an evasion of the tax on dividends by a corporate pur-
chase and subsequent distribution of investment securities or real
estate in redemption of part of the stock of the corporation, and it
will also probably prevent the distribution of a factory, a patent
or similar assets by the corporation. 2 The five-year rule, coupled
with the prohibition on the acquisition of either of the trades or
businesses by purchase," will prevent the corporation from accumu-
60. The House Bill had limited the concept of partial liquidation to distributions
meeting requirements similar to those of § 346(b), but the draftsmen of the Senate Bill
added the more general language of § 346(a)(2). See H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 336(a) (1954).
61. See Edward L. Kraus, 6 T.C. 105 (1946).
62. T.D. 6152, 26 C.F.R. § 1.346-1(c) (1955), provides "the term 'active conduct
of a trade or business' shall have the same meaning in this section" as in T.D. 6152, 26
C.F.R. § 1.355-1(c) (1955). On the effect of changes in the business, see H.R. REP. No.
2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1954).
For rulings under § 346(b) and § 355(b), see Rev. Rul. 56-513, 1956 Irr. REV. BULL.
No. 42, at 16; Rev. Rul. 56-512, 1956 INT. Rlv. BULL. No. 42, at 15; Rev. Rul. 56-450,
1956 rNT. Rzv. BuLL. No. 37, at 15; Rev. Rule 56-287, 1956 INT. RFv. BULL. No. 26, at 60.
See also Rev. Rul. 56-344, 1956 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 30, at 9; Rev. Rul. 56-227, 1956
INT. Rzv. BULL. No. 22, at 8.
63. The prohibition on acquiring the trade or business during the 5-year period "in
a transaction in which gain or loss was recognized in whole or in part" was obviously
intended to apply to transactions in which the transferor recognized gain or loss, even
though the transferee did not. See the reference to acquisition by "purchase" in the extract
Dec. 1956]
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lating its earnings and profits and investing its surplus in a farm,
ranch or similar property that the shareholders would otherwise
have acquired with taxable dividends, with a view to a prompt
distribution in partial liquidation under section 346(b). It will
not, however, prevent a similar plan for avoidance of the dividend
tax if the shareholders are patient. After the farm or ranch has
been held for five years, assuming its operation constitutes the
"active conduct of a trade or business," its distribution can qualify
under section 3 46(b), with a possible exception for transactions
that can be characterized as shams.
Although the statute does not explicitly require a plan of re-
demption under section 346(b), or even a redemption of stock,"
the Regulations take the position that the distribution under sec-
tion 3 46(b) must occur in the taxable year in which the plan is
adopted or within the following taxable year. 5
II. STOCK REDEMnONS
If a redemption of stock does not meet the qualifications of a
partial liquidation, it may nevertheless be accorded capital gain or
loss treatment by section 302.65 Section 302(a) provides that a re-
demption of stock shall be treated as a distribution in part or full
payment in exchange for the stock if it falls into any one of four
categories:
from SENATE RaPoRr 262, quoted at note 59 supra. Moreover, acquisition by purchase is
probably prohibited even though gain or loss was not recognized because the price paid
happens to be exactly equal to the adjusted basis of the acquired trade or business. The
Senate Report's reference to acquisition by purchase, as well as the purpose of the section,
also indicate that the purchase (within the 5-year period) of a trade or business from a
corporation that recognizes no gain or loss on the sale under § 337 should not qualify. It
would seem that gain or loss is recognized in such a transaction, within the meaning of
§ 346(b), by the shareholders of the selling corporation on its liquidation, since the sale
under § 337 and the liquidation of the selling corporation constitute an integrated trans-
action. A more sophisticated variation on this theme would be a purchase by the distribut-
ing corporation of the stock of a second corporation, followed by a sale by the second
corporation of its trade or business to the first corporation under § 337. Here the liquida-
tion of the second corporation would not produce gain or loss to anyone if the liquidating
proceeds were equal to the price paid by the distributing corporation for the stock of the
second corporation. But the acquisition of the stock of the second corporation would have
produced gain or loss to its original shareholders, and this could be regarded as a "transac-
tion in which gain or loss was recognized in whole or in part" within the meaning of
§ 346(b). It should be noted, however, that § 346(b) is not as explicit as § 355(b)(2),
which, in dealing with a similar problem, prohibits not only the acquisition of a trade or
business during the 5-year period but also the acquisition of a corporation conducting the
trade or business. See H.R. REP. No. 2543, 83 Cong., 2d Sess. 37-38 (1954).
64. A redemption is probably implicitly required by § 331(a) (2).
65. T.D. 6152, 26 C.F.R. § 1.346-1(b) (1955).
66. See note 23 supra.
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i) A complete redemption of all of the shareholder's stock
under section 302(b)(3)-
2) A substantially disproportionate redemption of the share-
holder's stock under section 3 02(b) (2).
3) A redemption that is not essentially equivalent to a divi-
dend under section 3 02(b)(i).
4) A redemption of the stock of certain railroad corporations
under section 302(b)(4).
By virtue of section 3 o2(d), a redemption that does not fall into
one of the foregoing categories is treated as a distribution under
section 301 and will therefore constitute a dividend includable in
gross income to the extent of current and post-1913 earnings and
profits, and a return of capital to the extent of the excess." Only the
first three of the above categories will be discussed below.
x. Termination of a Shareholder's Entire Interest:
Section 3 02(b)( 3 )
Section 3 02(b) (3) provides that a redemption shall be treated
as a sale if it "is in complete redemption of all of the stock of the
corporation owned by the shareholder." If a corporation is owned
by A and B, two unrelated persons, a redemption of all of the stock
of either A or B will qualify under section 302(b) (3). A redemp-
tion of this type was similarly treated as a sale, rather than a divi-
dend, under pre-I954 law.6"
a) The Attribution Rules. But what if shareholders A and B
are related? Section 302(c) provides that in determining the
ownership of stock under section 302, the constructive ownership
rules of section 318 (a) shall apply." By virtue of these rules an
67. See note 103 inlra.
68. See note 13 supra.
69. Taxpayers are put into the same boat as their relatives by many sections of the
1954 Code, but a close relative for one purpose is not necessarily close enough for another.
By an insight into the emotional ties of the contemporary family that is denied to most
of us, the draftsmen of the Code have decided that a taxpayer shall be charged with his
brother's stock by § 267, in order to disallow losses on the sale of property to his brother's
corporation, but not by § 318 in order to determine whether a redemption terminates his
stock interest under § 302(b) (3). And they have decided that he shall be charged with
his brother-in-law's stock by § 341(d) in computing gain on the sale of stock in a col-
lapsible corporation but not by § 544(a) in characterizing the same corporation as a
personal holding company. For a tabulation of unwanted kinsmen, see Frank, Know
Thy Kin, 33 TmXms 409 (1955), to which could be added the variations on § 544(a)
introduced by § 341(d).
The 1939 Code did not explicitly attribute stock owned by one person to another in
the application of § 115(g). In 1951 the Treasury Department announced a proposal to
amend the Regulations under § 115(g) (see note 13 supra) to provide that the redemption
of all of the stock of a particular shareholder would "generally" not be subject to § 115(g),
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individual is "considered as owning" any stock owned by cer-
tain members of his family (his spouse, children, grandchildren
and parents), owned by partnerships, estates, certain trusts and
certain corporations in which he is financially interested or sub-
ject to any option held by him. If B is A's son or A's wholly
owned corporation, B's stock would be imputed to A (and vice
versa) under section 38(a). A redemption of all the stock actually
owned by either A or B would not qualify under section 3o2(b)
()- In the case of "family" corporations, the constructive owner-
ship rules will frequently prevent a redemption of all the stock
actually owned by one shareholder from qualifying under section
3 02(b) (3), especially because there may be more than one link in
the chain of imputed ownership.
b) Waiver of the Family Attribution Rules. But the construc-
tive ownership rules of section 318(a) are not inescapable. Section
302(c) (2) provides that the family attribution rules shall not apply
to a shareholder whose stock is redeemed if immediately after
the distribution he has no "interest" in the corporation (including
an interest as officer, director or employee), other than an interest
as a creditor, and if he does not acquire any such interest (other
than stock acquired by bequest or inheritance)7" within ten years
from the date of the distribution.'
This waiver of the family attribution rules will clear the way
to a redemption under section 3 02(b) (3), if the distributee is will-
ing and able to forgo any interest in the corporation (except an
interest as a creditor and an interest arising from the acquisition
of stock by bequest or inheritance) for a period of ten years. The
theory of the family attribution rules and of their waiver may be
but that "where such shareholder is closely related to remaining shareholders, that factor
will be considered along with all other circumstances of the case in determining whether
the distribution is essentially equivalent to a dividend." 16 FED. REG. 10312 (1951). The
proposed amendment was withdrawn after the 1954 Code was enacted. 19 FED. REo.
7159 (1954). Even without the aid of the regulations, both the courts and the Internal
Revenue Service have at times regarded the relationship between a shareholder whose
stock was redeemed and the remaining shareholders as significant. See Irwin G. Lukens,
26 T.C. No. 113 (July 31, 1956); William H. Grimditch, 37 B.T.A. 402, 412 (1938);
Rev. Rul. 55-547, 1955-2 Cum. BULL. 571; Rev. Rul. 55-373, 1955-1 Cum. BuLL. 363.
But see Estate of Ira F. Searle, 9 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 957 (1950).
70. The phrase "bequest, devise, or inheritance" under Int. Rev. Code of 1939
§ 113(a)(5), 53 STAT. 41, prescribing the basis of property so acquired, excluded several
types of acquisition that were similar to bequests.
71. INT. RMv. CODE of 1954, § 302(c)(2)(A); T.D. 6152, 26 C.F.R. § 1.302-4(a),
(b) (1955). A taxpayer who relies on section 302(c)(2) for a waiver of the family
attribution rules must agree to notify the Treasury if he acquires any such interest in the
corporation, and the periods of limitation on assessment and collection of any deficiency
resulting from the acquisition of an interest are appropriately extended.
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stated in this fashion: a redemption of all the stock of a shareholder
is properly treated as a sale because it terminates his interest in the
corporation as effectively as a sale to a third person. The analogy
is not appropriate, however, if after the redemption stock is owned
by a member of the ex-shareholder's immediate family. It is suffi-
ciently possible that he will thereby continue his interest in the
corporation (without the interference from the outside that might
have resulted if he had sold his stock to a third person) that an
attribution of his relative's shares to him is a reasonable rule of
thumb. If, however, he is willing to give up for a ten-year period
any interest in the corporation, except those interests specifically
excluded, it is reasonable to waive the family attribution rules and
treat the redemption as a sale.
It should be noted that section 302(c) (2) waives only the family
attribution rules. There is no escape from the rules that attribute
stock to the taxpayer if he has a beneficial or indirect interest in it
through partnerships, estates, certain trusts or certain corporations,
or if he has an option to buy it. Moreover, stock held by a nominee
would undoubtedly be treated as owned by the principal without
reliance upon section 318, even if the nominee were not a relative
of the true owner.
The conditions attached by section 302(c) (2) to a waiver of the
family attribution rules are not without some ambiguities. The
prohibition of "an interest [in the corporation] as officer, director,
or employee" could be construed to bar employment coupled with
profit-sharing or a similar financial stake "in" the corporation,
rather than any and all employment whatsoever. But careful tax-
payers would seek a ruling before assuming that some types of em-
ployment are permissible." The permission to retain or acquire an
interest as a creditor will be especially important if the shareholder
72. Section 302(c) (2) (A) (i) does not explicitly prohibit employment or office-holding
per sc; it speaks of "an interest as officer, director, or employee," and this could be inter-
preted to mean something more than the performance of services alone. See Rev. Rul.
54-408, 1954-2 Cmi. BULL. 165, implying that a majority shareholder whose stock was
redeemed had ceased "to be interested in the affairs of the corporation" within the meaning
of the old regulations (see note 13 supra), even though he remained in the employ of the
corporation for four years to train new employees. On the other hand, the Commissioner
could argue from the specific exemption of "an interest as a creditor" that the term
"interest" is to be given the broadest possible construction. The Commissioner would
also find some comfort in H.R. RaP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 76 (1954). Turning
from the letter to the spirit, however, the purpose of prohibiting an interest is to prevent
a shareholder from ostensibly selling out but actually carrying on as before. This suggests
a more discriminating construction of the term "interest," though in a doubtful case it
would be more appropriate to lean toward strictness than liberality.
Dec. 1956 ]
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wishes to sell his shares to the corporation on credit, rather than for
cash. The Regulations appropriately warn against obligations "in
the form of debt" that in fact give the owner a "proprietary in-
terest,"73 but the application of this principle will not be easy.
The waiver of the family ownership rule found in section 302
(c) (2) (A) is denied in certain circumstances. Before examining
these conditions, which are set out in section 302(c) (2) (B), it may
be well to see an illustration of their purpose. If A owns all the
stock of Corporation C, and wishes to give his son a gift of cash,
he can of course use funds that he has received as dividends from
Corporation C, but only after they have been reported as income.
If he raises the funds by causing the corporation to redeem part of
his stock, the redemption will probably be taxed as a dividend74
What about giving his son some stock in Corporation C and then
causing it to redeem the son's stock? If the transaction avoids the
sham category," A, Jr., could claim the shelter of section 3 02(b)
(3), avoiding the family attribution rules of section 38 (a) (which
if applicable would take the transaction out of section 302(b) (3)
by imputing A's unredeemed stock to A, Jr.) by forgoing any
"interest" in the corporation.
To frustrate plans of the type just described, section 302(c) (2)
(B) provides that the family attribution rules shall not be waived
in either of two instances: (i) If any part of the redeemed stock
were acquired,"' directly or indirectly, within the previous ten years
by the distributee from a related person,7 or (2) if any related per-
son owns stock at the time of the distribution and acquired any
stock, directly or indirectly, from the distributee within the pre-
73. In contradistinction to the proposed Regulations, § 1.302-4(d), 19 Fyn. RaG. 8240
(1954), which prohibited obligations that were contingent upon earnings as to either prin-
cipal or interest, the final Regulations permit interest to be geared to corporate earnings in
some cases. T.D. 6152, 26 C.F.R. § 1.302-4(d) (1955).
74. It would not meet the requirements of § 302(b) (3), because only part of A's
stock was redeemed, nor those of § 302(b) (2) (see p. 42 infra), because A owns more
than 50% of the common stock of the corporation after the redemption; and it would
probably not meet the requirements of § 302(b) (1) (see pp. 42-45 infra) unless other sig-
nificant facts were present.
75. A blatant case could be treated like an anticipatory assignment of a dividend,
i.e., as though the redeemed shares had been acquired by the corporation from the father,
followed by a gift of the proceeds to the son. See Rhodes' Estate v. Commissioner, 131
F.2d 50 (6th Cir. 1942).
76. It is immaterial whether the acquisition was by gift or for consideration. SENATA
REPoR' 237.
77. That is, "a person the ownership of whose stock would (at the time of the dis-
tribution) be attributable to the distributee under section 318(a)." INT. Rav. CoDE oF
1954, § 302(c) (2) (B) (i). It is not dear whether this embraces any person whose stock,
if he owned any at the time of the distribution, would be attributable to the distributee or
is limited to persons who are in fact shareholders at the time of the distribution.
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vious ten years, unless the stock so acquired is redeemed in the
same transaction."8
These limitations on the waiver of the family attribution rules
are not applicable under section 302(c) (2) (B) if the acquisition in
(i) above or the disposition in (2) above did not have "as one of
its principal purposes the avoidance of Federal income tax." The
Regulations state that a transfer "shall not be deemed to have as
one of its principal purposes the avoidance of Federal income tax
merely because the transferee is in a lower income tax bracket
than the transferor." 9 It may be, however, that a transfer to such
a person for the purpose of reducing the total family income tax
burden would prevent a waiver of the family attribution rules.
A transfer to avoid federal estate tax does not act as a bar to a
waiver of the family attribution rules.
c) Redemption Following Sale. Section 3 02(b) (3) requires,
as we have seen, a redemption of "all of the stock of the corpora-
tion owned by the shareholder." Suppose the shareholder sells part
of his stock and the corporation, by prearrangement, redeems the
rest. In a celebrated pre-i954 case involving a one-man corporation,
the Internal Revenue Service contended that such a redemption
was a dividend to the original shareholder under section 115(g) of
the 1939 Code, arguing that the redemption of part of his stock
would have been a dividend if it occurred before the sale and that
the result should be the same where the redemption followed the
sale by prearrangement. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit held to the contrary," however, and the Internal Revenue
Service announced that it would not continue to litigate the issue."
78. This provision would apply, for example, if a shareholder gave some of his shares
to his son and the corporation thereupon redeemed the retained shares, unless the shares
given to the son were redeemed in the same transaction. It is not clear why § 302(c) (2) (B)
provides that the very shares which were acquired by the related person from the dis-
tributee must be redeemed in the same transaction; the purpose of the provision would
be served if an equivalent number of other shares were redeemed. Moreover, the provision
apparently (and unaccountably) would not be satisfied by a redemption of all the stock
of the related person in the same transaction if he had previously transferred to a third
party the shares which he acquired from the distributee.
79. T.D. 6152, 26 C.F.R. § 1.302-4(g) (2) (1955). See SENATE Rs, oRT 237.
80. Zenz v. Quinlivan, 213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954), reversing 106 F. Supp. 57
(N.D. Ohio 1952). See also Auto Finance Co., 24 T.C. 416 (1955), aff'd, 229 F.2d 318
(4th Cir. 1956), where the ex-shareholder, a corporation, urged that the transaction con-
stituted a "dividend" in order to take advantage of the dividends received credit of the
1939 Code. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 26(b), 53 STAT. 18.
81. Rev. Rul. 54-458, 1954-2 Cmi. BumL 167. In acquiescing in Zenz v. Quinlivan,
supra note 80, the Internal Revenue Service stated that "every case in which a stockholder
sells part of his stock to new or existing stockholders and thereafter transfers the remainder
to the corporation for redemption will be closely scrutinized to determine whether the
selling stockholder 'ceases to be interested in the affairs of the corporation' immediately
Dec. 1956 ]
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It has also announced that such a transaction meets the require-
ments of section 302(b) (3) of the 1954 Code." It should not be
assumed, however, that section 302(b) (3) will be satisfied by a sale
of stock followed by a prearranged redemption of the transferred
stock. Such a transaction might be treated as a redemption of part
of the shares of the original shareholder, rather than as a redemp-
tion of all of the shares of the transferee83
To continue with the illustration of a sale of part of the stock
of a one-man corporation followed by a prearranged redemption
of the remaining shares, is it possible that the redemption will be
treated as a dividend to the purchaser of the other shares? If he
bought all the shares and then caused some of them to be re-
deemed, the redemption would of course not qualify under section
3 02(b) (3) as a redemption of all of his shares." Under the 1939
Code, moreover, a taxpayer who contracted to buy the stock on the
installment plan and then caused the corporation to take over part
of his obligation to the seller by redeeming some of the shares was
held in Wall v. United States" to have received a dividend. A re-
demption under such circumstances was considered by the court
to be the equivalent of a payment by the corporation of the tax-
payer's personal debt:
after the redemption." id. at 168. The "ceases to be interested" requirement comes from
the "old" regulations (see note 13 supra), and may have been intended to exclude an ar-
rangement for paying for the redeemed shares only out of, or in an amount measured by,
corporate profits. There is no such ban in the language of § 302(b)(3), and § 302(c)(2)
(A) (i) may support, by negative inference, the conclusion that a redemption of all the
stockholder's shares qualifies under § 302(b)(3) even if he possesses an "interest" in the
corporation after the redemption. See First, Use of Corporate Funds to Buy Out Share-
holders-Acquisitions by Third Parties, N.Y.U. 12 INst. O N Fr. TAx. 191 (1954);
Redlich, The Sale of a Closely-Held Corporate Buiness, 9 TAx L. REv. 354 (1954); Note,
Income Tax Problems in the Use of Stock Redemptions to Purchase a Corporation Out of
Future Earnings, 67 HA~v. L. REv. 1387 (1954) (all written before the district court
opinion in Zenz v. Quinlivan, supra note 80, was reversed by the court of appeals).
82. Rev. Rul. 55-745, 1955-2 Cutm. BuLL. 223. This ruling states that Rev. Rul.
54-458, 1954-2 CuM. BULL. 167 (see note 81 supra), is "equally applicable under the
1954 Code." It is possible that if a selling shareholder retains an "interest" in the cor-
poration, the Service might assert that the transaction does not come within the terms of
its ruling and then proceed to advance the broad contention that a redemption after a sale
is no different from a redemption before a sale. The latter transaction could not claim the
protection of § 302(b) (3), unless the fact that at the time of the redemption the share-
holder had already contracted to sell the rest of his shares gives rise, by analogy to the
principle of "equitable conversion," to the assumption that he no longer owns them. One
writer suggests that a redemption of some shares before a sale of the rest is not essentially
equivalent to a dividend. Redlich, The Sale of a Closely-Held Corporate Business, 9 TAX
L. REv. 354, 363 (1954).
83. The theory would be that the original shareholder made an anticipatory assign-
ment of a dividend, i.e., the proceeds of redemption. See Rhodes' Estate v. Commissioner,
131 F.2d 50 (6th Cir. 1942).
84. Rev. Rul. 56-265, 1956 INT. Rev. Buar.. No. 25, at 14. See Lowenthal v. Com-
missioner, 169 F.2d 694 (7th Cir. 1948).
85. 164 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1947).
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The controlling fact in this situation was that Wall [the buyer] was
under an obligation to pay Coleman [the seller] $5,000 in the tax year
and that Rosedale [the corporation] paid this indebtedness for Wall out
of its surplus. It cannot be questioned that the payment of a taxpayer's
indebtedness by a third party pursuant to an agreement between them
is income to the taxpayer. . . . The transaction is regarded as the same
as if the money had been paid to the taxpayer and transmitted by him
to the creditor; and so if a corporation, instead of paying a dividend to a
stockholder, pays a debt for him out of its surplus, it is the same for tax
purposes as if the corporation pays a dividend to a stockholder, and the
stockholder then utilizes it to pay his debt.""
The principle of the Wall case is not applicable, however, if the
buyer agrees to purchase part of the seller's stock, and the corpora-
tion agrees simultaneously to redeem the rest. 7 The Tax Court
held in the case of Ray Edenfield8 that the redemption did not
constitute a dividend to the buyer in a case of this type even though
86. Id. at 464. The theory that the corporation has distributed a disguised dividend
by paying the shareholder's debt could not be applied if the corporation received adequate
consideration for its payment, e.g., if it took over a shareholder's obligation to buy a com-
modity and received delivery of the commodity itself. But the corporation derives no benefit
from taking over the shareholder's obligation to buy its own shares, even if the shares are
delivered to it. The court in the Wall case might have rested its decision solely on the theory
that the corporation had paid a disguised dividend by paying the shareholder's debt, a
theory that could stand independently of § 115(g) of the 1939 Code. The disguised divi-
dend theory could have been applied even by a court adhering to the view that § 1 15(g)
was inapplicable to redeemed shares held as treasury stock. See cases cited in note 53 supra.
But while the opinion in the Wall case rests in part on the broad theory that the distribu-
tion was a payment of the shareholder's debt (which is equally valid under the 1954 Code),
it also relies on § 115(g). This statutory foundation for the decision, it might be argued,
has been weakened by the 1954 Code. For § 115(g) provided that a redemption "at such
time and in such manner" as to be essentially equivalent to a taxable dividend shall be
treated as one. This language can be read, without distortion, to mean that if A's shares are
redeemed at a time when B is obligated to buy them, the redemption is equivalent to, and
shall be taxed as, a dividend to B. But the language of § 115(g) is partly abandoned
by § 302, and B can now argue that § 302(b) (3) flatly provides that a redemption of
all of A's shares is to be treated as a sale of the stock so that there is no occasion to apply
S 302(d). The Commissioner would be driven to answer that at the time of the redemp-
tion the shares were already B's "in substance," so that their redemption does not qualify
under § 302(b) (3), an argument that might be less congenial to some courts than
reliance on the language of old § 115(g).
The Wall case was followed in Woodworth v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 719 (6th Cir.
1955); Frank P. Holloway, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mere. 1257 (1951), aff'd per curiam, 203
F.2d 566 (6th Cir. 1953). See also Thomas J. French, 26 T.C. No. 32 (May 15, 1956).
87. See Fox v. Harrison, 145 F.2d 521 (7th Cir. 1944), where the corporation re-
deemed part of the stock of a shareholder who owned or controlled about two-thirds of
the stock. The balance of his stock was acquired in 1938 by the plaintiff (who owned or
controlled about one-third of the stock) with the purpose of causing it to be redeemed as
soon as the corporation was financially able to do so. It was held that a later redemption
in 1939 of part of the stock so acquired by the plaintiff was not equivalent to a dividend
to him, on the ground that the stock was "in reality" acquired by the corporation from
the original owner. See Mendle Silverman, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 527 (1954), where a
shareholder tried unsuccessfully to persuade the court that he (like the plaintiff in Fox v.
Harrison, supra) had acquired stock as agent for the corporation in anticipation of a
redemption.
88. 19 T.C. 13 (1952).
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he pledged his shares to insure that the corporation would perform
its part of the bargain, so long as he had no personal obligation to
acquire the shares that were redeemed. " The Internal Revenue
Service has acquiesced in this decision."0 It has been suggested that
the Wall case would not apply to the intermediate case of a corpo-
rate agreement to redeem, performance of which is personally
guaranteed by the purchaser of the other shares, but this issue
cannot be regarded as entirely settled." Another problem under
the Wall case is the extent to which an agreement between buyer
and seller, covering all the shares, can be rescinded so as to substi-
tute a corporate obligation to redeem some of the shares for an in-
dividual promise to purchase them. An attempt to call off an
agreement in order to substitute a corporate obligation, so as to
bring a redemption within the Edenfield case rather than the Wall
case, may be frustrated by the Commissioner with the aid of the
Court Holding Co." doctrine."
2. Substantially Disproportionate Redemptions:
Section 3 02(b)(2)
Because an ordinary dividend effects a distribution of property
to the corporation's shareholders without disturbing their relative
voting power and interest in the assets and earning power of the
corporation, a redemption of stock was most likely to qualify as
"essentially equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend"
under section 115(g) of the 1939 Code if it was pro rata among all
the shareholders. Conversely, a non-pro rata redemption ordinarily
escaped the clutches of section 115(g). 9' Section 3 o2(b) (2) of the
1954 Code has carried forward this distinction by providing that a
substantially disproportionate redemption is to be treated as a sale
89. Where cash is to be paid for the shares, there would obviously be no practical
difference to the buyer between a purchase of all the shares, followed by a redemption
from him of some, and a purchase of some shares with a simultaneous redemption of the
others from the seller. Under the Edenfield case, however, the difference in form would
determine whether the buyer received a dividend or not. If some shares are to be paid for
at a later date, the Wall case finds a dividend when the individual purchaser agrees to buy
and then causes the corporation to take over his obligation, while the Edenlield case
protects the purchaser if only the corporation is liable to the seller. Unless the corporation
is in a speculative line of endeavor, or the time for payment is long postponed, however,
it will rarely matter to either the seller or the individual purchaser (except for tax purposes)
whether the latter's credit or only the corporation's is pledged.
90. 1953-1 Cum. BuL.. 4.
91. See Redlich, The Sale of a Closely-Held Corporate Business, 9 TAx. L. Rav. 354,
358 (1954).
92. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 US. 331 (1945).
93. See note 168 infra.
94. See note 13 supra.
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or exchange of the stock rather than as a dividend. A shareholder
cannot avail himself of section 302(b) (2), however, unless imme-
diately after the redemption he owns, directly and constructively,
less than fifty percent of the total combined voting power of all
classes of stock entitled to vote.9" This restriction on section 3 02(b)
(2) is presumably based on the theory that a reduction in the pro-
portionate ownership of a shareholder is not significant if he re-
mains in control of the corporation after the redemption, as evi-
denced by the fifty percent of the combined voting power limi-
tation.
To be substantially disproportionate, the redemption must
satisfy a mathematical test expressed in section 3 02(b) (2) (C):
the shareholder's percentage of the total outstanding voting stock"
(owned directly and constructively) immediately after the redemp-
tion must be less than eighty percent of his percentage of such stock
immediately before the redemption. The Regulations set out the
following example to illustrate section 302(b) (2):
Corporation M has outstanding 400 shares of common stock of which
A, B, C and D each own ioo shares or 25 percent. No stock is considered
constructively owned by A, B, C or D under section 318. Corporation M
redeems 55 shares from A, 25 shares from B, and 2o shares from C. For
the redemption to be disproportionate as to any shareholder, such share-
holder must own after the redemptions less than 2o percent (8o percent
of 25 percent) of the 300 shares of stock then outstanding. After the re-
demptions, A owns 45 shares (15 percent), B owns 75 shares (25 per-
cent), and C owns 8o shares (263/ percent). The distribution is dis-
proportionate only with respect to A.
97
If the corporation has more than one class of stock outstanding,
the shareholder cannot make use of section 3 02(b) (2) unless the
redemption reduces his percentage of common stock, whether vot-
95. Section 302(c) (1) makes the constructive ownership rules of § 318(a) applicable
in determining the ownership of stock under § 302(b) (2). See note 96 infra.
96. The term "voting stock" is defined by the Regulations so as to exclude, at least
"generally," stock with contingent voting rights. T.D. 6152, 26 C.F.R. § 1.302-3(a)
(1955). The Regulations do not state whether the term "stock entitled to vote" (see note
95 supra) is the same as "voting stock." For problems in identifying "voting stock" and
"stock entitled to vote" and in computing "voting power," see Bittker, Stock Dividends,
Distributions in Kind, Redemptions, and Liquidations Under the 1954 Code, 1955 So.
CAI.n. TAx INsT. 349, 374-75.
97. T.D. 6152, 26 C.F.R. § 1.302-3(b) (1955). The Senate Report twice misapplies
the formula by disregarding the fact that the redemption reduces the number of shares
outstanding. SENATE REsoRT 234-35, 253. See Bernbach, Substantially Disproportionate
Redemptions Under the 1954 Act, 33 TAxES 597 (1955); Bittker, Stock Dividends, Dis-
tributions in Kind, Redemptions, and Liquidations Under the 1954 Code, 1955 So. CALiF.
TAx INsr. 349, 376-77.
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ing or nonvoting, as well as his percentage of voting stock." If the
corporation redeems only nonvoting stock, whether common or
preferred, the redemption cannot qualify under section 3o2(b) (2)
because it will not reduce the shareholder's proportionate owner-
ship of voting stock." But the redemption of nonvoting stock can
qualify, according to the Regulations, if it is coupled with a re-
demption of voting stock that would qualify if it stood alone °'0
To prevent an obvious abuse of section 3 02(b) (2), the statute
explicitly provides that it does not apply to any redemption pur-
suant to a plan for a series of redemptions which in the aggregate
will not be substantially disproportionate with respect to the share-
holder. Thus, to return to the illustration above, if the redemption
of the stock of A, B and C was in accordance with a plan by which
seventy-five of D's shares would later be redeemed, the redemption
of A's shares would not meet the test of section 302(b) (2). For
after the second step, 4 would own twenty percent of the total out-
standing shares (45 out of 225), an insufficient reduction in his per-
centage. °  The redemption of D's shares, however, would appar-
ently qualify even though it was the occasion for disallowing the
redemption of A's shares. It should not be assumed that this ex-
plicit reference to a plan for a "series of redemptions" is the Com-
missioner's only weapon against attempts to abuse section 3 02(b)
(2). If a redemption viewed in isolation is substantially dispropor-
98. The Regulations do not state explicitly whether or not § 302(b) (2) can be
invoked if the corporation redeems voting preferred stock without simultaneously redeem-
ing common. Since a redemption cannot qualify as substantially disproportionate unless
it satisfies the first sentence of § 302(b) (2) (C) (requiring a reduction in the share-
holder's ownership of voting stock), it seems equally necessary that it satisfy the second
sentence of § 302(b) (2) (C) (requiring a reduction in his ownership of common stock).
The Regulations state flatly that a redemption of nonvoting common stock alone does not
qualify as substantially disproportionate, presumably because it could not satisfy the first
sentence; and by a parity of reasoning a redemption of voting preferred stock alone would
not qualify because it could not satisfy the second sentence. T.D. 6152, 26 C.F.X.
§ 1.302-3(a) (1955).
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid. If a redemption of voting common is accompanied by a redemption of
nonvoting preferred, the shareholder's proportion of voting stock and common stock is
totally unaffected by the redemption of the nonvoting preferred. The Regulations are on
doubtful ground in expressing the view that the latter redemption can ride in on the coat-
tails of the redemption of common. See Bittker, Stock Dividends, Distributions in Kind,
Redemptions, and Liquidations Under the 1954 Code, 1955 So. CALrF. TAX INsT. 349, 370
n.67. But see Cohen, Redemptions of Stock Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
103 U. PA. L. Rtv. 739, 749-50 (1955).
101. A's percentage after the redemption would be exactly 80 percent (20/25) of his
percentage before the redemption. But § 302(b) (2) fixes the benchmark at "less than 80
percent."
Under the 1939 Code, and without specific statutory direction, an ostensibly non-
pro rata redemption was held to be pro rata because of a plan for later redemptions. Boyle
v. Commissioner, 187 P.2d 557 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 817 (1951).
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tionate as to a shareholder, but the other shareholders have agreed
to sell enough stock to him after the redemption to restore the
status quo, the redemption will probably not satisfy section 302
(b) (2).-
3. Redemptions Not Essentially Equivalent to Dividends:
Section 302(b)(i)
Section 3 o2(b) (i) provides that a redemption may be treated
like a sale of the redeemed stock if it "is not essentially equivalent
to a dividend." The language comes from section ii5(g) of the
1939 Code' The Regulations state that whether section 302(b)
(i) applies "depends upon the facts and circumstances of each
case."'0 3 Some commentators have argued that any redemption
that could have escaped section 115(g) of the 1939 Code will
qualify as not essentially equivalent to a dividend under section
302(b) (i).4 But the Senate Report rather clearly implies that
section 302 is concerned solely with "those distributions which may
have capital-gain characteristics because they are not made pro rata
among the various shareholders . ,,os This general limitation
of section 3 o2(b) to non-pro rata redemptions helps to explain the
102. See pp. 14-15 supra.
103. T.D. 6152, 26 C.F.R. § 1.302-2(b) (1955). The Regulations take the surprising
position that a distribution may be "essentially equivalent to a dividend," even though the
corporation has no earnings and profits, giving as an example the redemption of part of its
stock by a one-man corporation without earnings and profits. T.D. 6152, 26 C.F.R.
§ 1.302-2(a) (1955). The consequences of the Regulations can be illustrated by this ex-
ample: A, an individual, purchased all of the stock of Corporation X for $100,000. The
corporation, at a time when it has no earnings and profits, redeems half of the stock for
$110,000. Under the Regulations, the distribution falls under § 301; it would reduce the
basis of A's retained stock to zero, and the excess of $10,000 would be taxed as capital
gain. If, contrary to the Regulations, the distribution qualified under § 302(b) (1) as not
essentially equivalent to a dividend because of the absence of earnings and profits, A would
have a capital gain of $60,000 under § 302(a) (proceeds of $110,000 less basis of one-half
the stock), and the basis of his retained shares would remain intact. The latter result
might be preferable if A had an otherwise useless capital loss in the year of redemption
against which the capital gain could be offset.
The view of the Regulations that a distribution can be essentially equivalent to a
dividend even though the corporation has no earnings and profits is based on the theory
that the quoted phrase means "having the same effect as a distribution without any redemp-
tion of stock" and is derived from a statement in the SENaE REoRr 234. Presumably the
draftsmen of the Senate Report meant either to override the definition of dividend in
§ 316(a) or to adopt the theory that earnings and profits are not an essential characteristic
of a dividend.
104. Cohen, Redemptions of Stocl Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 103
U. PA. L. Rav. 739, 743-44 (1955); Laikin, Stock Redemptions: Sections 302 and 318,
N.Y.U. 14TH INST. oN FED. TAx., 671, 685-86 (1956).
105. SENATE REPoRT 49, quoted at p. 17 supra. The statement cannot be applied
literally, since § 302(b) (4) (redemption of certain railroad stock) is applicable to a
pro rata redemption, but it is reasonable to assume that, with this minor exception, the
statement in the Senate Report is an authoritative explanation of § 302.
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meaning of this statement regarding section 3 o2(b) (i) in the Sea-
ate Report:
Subsection (b) of section 302 states three conditions in paragraphs
(1), (2), (3), and (4), the satisfaction of any one of which will result
in the treatment of the redemption as a distribution in full or part pay-
ment in exchange for the stock. In general, under this subsection your
committee intends to incorporate into the bill existing law as to whether
or not a redemption is essentially equivalent to a dividend under section
115(g)(1) of the 1939 Code, and in addition to provide three definite
standards in order to provide certainty in specific instances.
Paragraph (i) of subsection (b) provides that subsection (a) will
apply if the redemption is not essentially equivalent to a dividend.
The test intended to be incorporated in the interpretation of paragraph
(i) is in general that currently employed under section II5(g) (r) of the
1939 Code. Your committee further intends that in applying this test
for the future that the inquiry will be devoted solely to the question of
whether or not the transaction by its nature may properly be characterized
as a sale of stock by the redeeming shareholder to the corporation.
0 6
Still further evidence in support of a very restricted application
of section 3 02(b) (i) is its history. It was added by the Senate
Finance Committee after the passage by the House of Resolution
83oo,'°. providing for capital gains treatment primarily in circum-
stances similar to those now set out in section 3 o2(b) (2) (substan-
tially disproportionate redemptions) and section 3 o2(b) (3) (ter-
minations of the shareholder's entire stock interest).' The Senate
Finance Committee explained the addition of the general language
of section 3 02(b) (i) in the Senate Report as follows:
While the House bill set forth definite conditions under which stock may
be redeemed at capital-gain rates, these rules appeared unnecessarily re-
strictive, particularly, in the case of redemptions of preferred stock which
might be called by the corporation without the shareholder having any
control over when the redemption may take place. Accordingly, your
committee follows existing law by reinserting the general language indi-
cating that a redemption shall be treated as a distribution in part or full
payment in exchange for stock if the redemption is not essentially equiva-
lent to a dividend. 10 9
It is not easy to give section 3 02(b) (i) an expansive construction
in view of this indication that its major function was the narrow
106. SENATE REPORT 233-34.
107. H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
108. Id. § 302(a).
109. SENATE REPoar 44-45.
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one of immunizing redemptions of minority holdings of preferred
stock.
Against this background, it is not surprising that the only
example of a section 3 02(b) (i) redemption to be found in the
Regulations is a redemption of one-half of the nonvoting preferred
stock of a shareholder who owns no shares of any other class."0
The redemption could not qualify under section 3 02(b) (2) since
no reduction in voting stock results from the redemption"' or
under section 302(b) (3) since not all of the shareholder's stock is
redeemed."2 The redemption may be pro rata among all the
owners of nonvoting preferred stock, but it is not pro rata in the
broader sense unless they also own common stock in the same pro-
portion; and the transaction "may properly be characterized as a
sale of stock by the redeeming shareholder to the corporation."
'
The sale analogy was also applied in a recent ruling to the redemp-
tion of stock from a group of four trusts which, with their bene-
ficiaries and the families of the beneficiaries, owned eleven percent
of the stock of the corporation. Another five percent of the stock
was owned by trusts created for cousins of the trust beneficiaries,
and the remaining eighty-four percent was owned by strangers.
The redemption apparently did not qualify as substantially dispro-
portionate under section 3 02(b) (2), but because of the minority
position of the trusts whose shares were redeemed, the transaction
could properly be characterized as a sale of the stock."' To be sure,
a redemption that is disproportionate but not substantially so
should not be allowed to use section 3 o2(b) (i) as an easy escape
from the rigor of section 3o2(b) (2). But the redemption of a few
shares from a minority shareholder can properly be called a non-
pro rata redemption, even though it is not substantially dispropor-
tionate within the meaning of section 3 o2(b) (2). In another
110. T.D. 6152, 26 C.F.R. § 1.302-2(a) (1955). As to constructive ownership, see
note 117 inlra.
111. See T.D. 6152, 26 C.F.R. § 1.302-3(a) (1955).
112. T.D. 6152, 26 C.F.R. § 1.302-2(a) (1955). See INT. RFV. CODE oF 1954,
§ 302(b) (5).
113. SEr;A REPoRT 233-34. The Regulations state that the redemption '.ill "ordi-
narily" qualify. T.D. 6152, 26 C.F.R. § 1.302-2(a) (1955). The reservation may be
intended to exclude transactions that are more appropriately treated as dividends than as
sales, e.g., a redemption of preferred stock transferred by gift by a controlling shareholder
in anticipation of a redemption. See William S. Grimditch, 37 B.T.A. 402, 412 (1938).
114. Rev. Rul. 56-183, 1956 INT. REv. BULL. No. 18, at 29. While the ruling does
not so state, it is reasonable to assume that the four trusts did not in fact control the cor-
poration. The absence of a market for the shares suggests that the 84 percent held by
strangers was not so widely scattered as to leave working control of the corporation in the
four trusts.
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recent ruling in which a redemption was held to qualify under
section 302(b) (i), although it was not substantially disproportion-
ate under section 3 02(b) (2), the Internal Revenue Service noted
that:
In the instant case, the transaction ... by its nature can be characterized
as a sale of stock by the shareholder. The two shareholders are unrelated
and there is no pro rata distribution in whole or part effected by the
transaction." 5
The Regulations under section 302(b) (i) state that if a corpo-
ration has only one class of stock outstanding, a pro rata redemp-
tion "generally" will be treated as a distribution under section 301,
and that if a corporation has more than one class outstanding, a
redemption of an entire class will also generally come under section
301 if all classes of stock are held in the same proportion" 6 No
doubt many fervent arguments will be based on that phrase "gen-
erally" in an effort to bring some pro rata redemptions under the
protection of section 302(b) (i). One instance in which the argu-
ment may succeed is the redemption that is pro rata only because
of the constructive ownership rules of section 318(a), which the
Regulations state is one of the facts to be considered in determining
whether a distribution is not essentially equivalent to a dividend."7
This statement, which is weaker than the position that had been
taken in the proposed Regulations,, may open the door to proof
that by reason of family estrangement, for example, shares owned
by a spouse or by children should not be attributed to the taxpayer
whose shares are being redeemed, thus allowing the redemption to
qualify under section 302(b) (i) although the attribution rules
would prevent qualification under section 302(b) (2). More dubi-
ous is the possibility of applying section 302(b) (I) to a redemption
that is undeniably pro rata but which serves a corporate purpose
that might have led to nondividend treatment under the 1939
115. Rev. Rul. 55-462, 1955-2 Curi. BULL. 221. See also Rev. Rul. 56-485, 1956
INT. Rav. BULL. No. 40, at 10.
116. T.D. 6125,26 C.F.R. § 1.302-2(b) (1955).
117. Ibid. Section 318(a) states that its rules are to be applied only where "expressly
made applicable." Section 302(c)(1) states that these rules shall "apply in determining
the ownership of stock for purposes of this section." It has been argued that they are not
applicable under § 302(b)(1) because it does not expressly refer to the "ownership"
of stock. Cohen, Redemptions of Stock Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 103
U. PA. L. Rav. 739, 758-59 (1955). But the rules of § 318(a) are "expressly" made
applicable "in determining the ownership of stock" under § 302, and consequently it
is reasonable to apply them whenever ownership of stock is relevant, whether by statutory
direction or otherwise.
118. Proposed Regulations, § 1.302-2(b), 19 FED. RE. 8239 (1954).
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Code. Examples are the acquisition by the corporation of shares
for resale to junior employees or the improvement of the corporate
balance sheet by a redemption in cancellation of debts owed by the
shareholders to the corporation.1 9 The repeated references in the
Senate Report to non-pro rata distributions and the guarded
phraseology of the Regulations are hardly conducive to the whole-
sale importation into section 3 02(b) (i) of pre-i954 law. Moreover,
the rulings of the Internal Revenue Service manifest, so far at least,
an intent to confine section 302(b) (i) to non-pro rata redemp-
tions. ° To those already mentioned may be added a recent ruling
which held that a redemption of some of the stock of a majority
shareholder to enable an employee to increase his holdings under
an earlier stock option agreement is essentially equivalent to a divi-
dend because it did not produce an "appreciable change in position
of the parties involved."'' Another illustration of the same reluc-
tance to convert section 302(b) (i) into an escape from section 302
(b) (,) is a ruling that redemption of the stock of a decedent's
estate, which was not substantially disproportionate under section
302(b) (2) because of the constructive ownership rules, is a divi-
dend in its entirety, notwithstanding the corporation's obligation
to redeem part of the stock upon the decedent's death under an
earlier agreement
12
III. REDEMNTION BY AFFLiAT.D CORORaMON
Section 302, which determines when stock redemptions shall be
treated as exchanges of the stock and when as dividend distribu-
tions, applies to a redemption by a corporation of "its" stock. What
if a corporation purchases the stock of another corporation? If the
two corporations are not affiliated in any way, there is no reason
why the transaction should not be taken at face value and treated
as an ordinary purchase of stock by the corporation so that the
seller will realize capital gain or loss. But should the same rule
apply if the two corporations are affiliated, e.g., if a shareholder
119. See Bittker, Stock Dividends, Distributions in Kind, Redemptions and Liquida-
tions Under the 1954 Code, 1955 So. CtA~F. Tx INsT. 393-94.
120. See Rev. Rul. 56-485, 1956 INT. Rav. BuLL. No. 40, at 10; Rev. Rul. 56-183,
1956 INT. Rzv. Bum. No. 18, at 29; Rev. Rul. 55-462, 1955-2 Cum. BULL. 221.
121. Rev. Rul. 56-182, 1956 INr. REv. BuLL. No. 18, at 28, 29. See also Rev. Rul.
55-515, 1955-2 Cum. BULL. 222. But note that it has been held that a redemption of
stock for the purpose of resale is not pro rata, over the long run, because the resale disturbs
the relative position of the shareholders. Smith v. United States, 131 Ct. Cl. 748, 130 F.
Supp. 586 (1955).
122. Rev. Rul. 56-103, 1956 INT. Ray. BuLL. No. 12, at 7.
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sells stock in a parent corporation to a subsidiary? The net effect
of such a transaction is about the same as a distribution of assets by
the subsidiary to its parent, followed by a redemption by the parent
of its own stock. Had the transaction taken the latter form, it
would have been taxed as a section 301 distribution unless it quali-
fied under section 3o2(b) (i) (not essentially equivalent to a divi-
dend), section 3 o2(b) (2) (substantially disproportionate redemp-
tions), section 3o2(b) (3) (termination redemptions) or section 303
(redemptions to pay death taxes). But when the Commissioner
sought, under section 1i5(g) of the 1939 Code, to tax the share-
holder of a parent corporation who had sold stock in the parent
to its subsidiary, the transaction was held not to be a redemption by
the subsidiary of "its" stock.' The 1939 Code was thereupon
amended by the Revenue Act of i95o 24 to require such a trans-
action to be treated as though the subsidiary had distributed assets
to its parent and the parent had redeemed its own stock.
The 195o legislation did not purport to reach an alternate
method of achieving a similar result. If A owns all the stock of
two corporations, and sells the stock of one to the other, the eco-
nomic consequences are the same as though the second corporation
had distributed property to him without any surrender of stock,
except for the fact (which would often lack any practical conse-
quences) that the second corporation now owns some of the stock
of the first corporation. Nevertheless, the Internal Revenue Service
-was unsuccessful in its efforts to tax such a "brother-sister" redemp-
tion as a dividend. 2"
The 1954 Code, however, not only carried forward the i95o
legislation on parent-subsidiary redemptions, but also enacted new
rules to govern brother-sister redemptions' 2 Under section 304, if
a subsidiary corporation acquires the stock of a parent, the trans-
:action is to be treated as a redemption by the corporation that
123. Rodman Wanamaker Trust, 11 T.C. 365 (1948), aff'd per curiam, 178 F.2d 10
(3d Cir. 1949).
124. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 115(g)(2), added by 64 STAT. 932 (1950).
125. Roger W. Pope, 15 CCH Tax Ct. lem. 181 (1956); Emma Cramer, 20 T.C. 679
(1953). The Internal Revenue Service has ruled that when a sole shareholder of two cor-
porations "sells" stock in one to the other, "there is no economic reality to the sale insofar
as any relinquishment of interest by the sole shareholder ... is concerned," and that the
proceeds of the "sale" constitute an ordinary dividend to the extent of the earnings and
profits of the acquiring corporation. Rev. Rul. 55-15, 1955-1 Cum. BUtLL. 361. Al-
though the ruling was directed to the facts of a particular transaction, it was probably
intended to have general application.
126. INT. REv. CoDa oF 1954, § 304. An attempt by the House of Representatives
to include a similar provision in the 1950 legislation (see note 124 supra) was repulsed by
the Senate. S. REs'. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1950).
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issued the stock. But if a brother corporation acquires the stock of
a sister corporation, the transaction is to be treated as a redemption
by the corporation that acquired the stock. In neither instance,
however, is the redemption necessarily a section 3oi distribution. It
may be treated as an exchange if it can meet the test of sections
3 02(b) or 303.
It has been suggested that every brother-sister pair of corpora-
tions is also, by reason of the constructive ownership rules of sec-
tions 3o4 and 318, a parent-subsidiary group.2 ' This suggestion is
based on the fact that if a person is in control of two corporations,
his stock in each one is attributed to the other, so each corporation
is in control of the other. The Regulations assume to the contrary
that brother-sister corporations can be distinguished from parent-
subsidiary corporations.1 2 ' This assumption must have been
shared by the draftsmen of the 1954 Code and finds support in the
statement in section 3o4(b) (2) (B) that the acquisition by a sub-
sidiary of its parent's stock shall be taxed "as if the property were
distributed by the acquiring corporation to the issuing corporation
and immediately thereafter distributed by the issuing corporation."
Since the hypothetical distribution by the acquiring corporation to
127. Owen, Stock Redemptions and Partial Liquidations Under the 1954 Code, 32
TAxEs 979, 988 (1954).
128. T.D. 6152, 26 C.F.R. § 1.304-2 (1955). The Regulations give three examples
of brother-sister redemptions. T.D. 6152, 26 C.F.R. § 1.304-2(c) (1955). In each ex-
ample, however, Corporation X could be regarded as the parent of Corporation Y before
the sale on the theory that it constructively owns 50 percent or more of the stock of Corpo-
ration Y because Xs shareholders do.
Apparently § 304 looks only to control immediately be/ore the sale of stock. But even
if control must exist after the sale, in each of the examples in the Regulations Corporation
X is the parent of Corporation Y after, as well as before, the sale. In example (1), after the
sale Corporation X constructively owns the 50 shares of Corporation Y owned by X's share-
holder B. Moreover, Corporation X also constructively owns the 50 shares of Corporation Y
owned by X's shareholder A. While § 318(a) (2) (C) attributes a shareholder's stock to
his corporation ("back attribution") only if he owns 50 percent or more of the latter's
stock, § 304(c) (2) removes the 50 percent limitation of § 318(c) (2) (C), with the result
that a corporation is charged with all the stock owned by minority shareholders. In example
(2), after the sale Corporation X constructively owns the 50 shares of Corporation Y owned
by X's shareholder A. In example (3), after the sale Corporation X constructively owns
the 75 shares of Corporation Y owned by X's shareholders W, S and G.
Even if the shareholder disposes of all his stock in the issuing corporation, he con-
tinues to be a constructive shareholder in it because a portion of the stock he has just
disposed of is attributed to him as a shareholder in the acquiring corporation, and the
issuing corporation is therefore charged with his stock in the acquiring corporation. The
only way the chain can be broken is by a simultaneous sale of all of the stock owned, directly
and constructively, in each corporation to the other. Thus, if in example (2), A sold his
50 shares of Corporation X stock to Corporation Y and simultaneously sold his 50 shares
of Corporation Y stock to Corporation X, neither corporation would own stock, even con-
structively, in the other. As indicated above, however, § 304 apparently looks only to
control before the sale. If so, the simultaneous sale of stock in each corporation to the other
would not prevent the application of § 304(a) (2). The transaction would qualify for
capital gain or loss treatment, however, under § 302(b)(3).
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the issuing corporation could occur only if the latter were in a
chain of actuam ownership (i.e., an actual parent, grandparent,
etc.), it is reasonable to limit the parent-subsidiary rule of section
3o4(b) (2) (B) to corporations that could have distributed the prop-
erty upward in an unbroken chain of actual ownership, relegating
the brother-sister rule of section 3o4(b)(2)(A) to other related
corporations. This may be the theory that underlies the examples
in the Regulations 2
IV. REDEMPnONS To PAY DEATH TAxES
Section 303 provides that in certain cases a redemption of stock,
the value of which has been included in the gross estate of a de-
cedent for federal estate tax purposes, shall be treated as a sale of
the stock. Where the conditions of section 303 are met, the re-
demption is treated as a sale even though it would, but for section
303, be taxed as a dividend under section 3 02(d). For example, if
all the stock of a corporation is held by an estate, a redemption of
part of the stock would not qualify for capital gains treatment
under section 3 02(b)(2) (substantially disproportionate redemp-
tions) or under section 3o2(b) (3) (redemptions in termination of
a shareholder's interest), nor in the absence of other relevant facts
could it qualify under section 302(b) (i) (redemptions not essen-
tially equivalent to a dividend) or section 331 (a) (2) (partial liqui-
dations). If the conditions of section 303 are satisfied, however,
such a redemption would be treated as a sale."' Another example
is the redemption of stock from an estate when the rest of the shares"
are owned by the sole beneficiary of the decedent's estate. Because
of the constructive ownership rules, the redemption of part or all
of the estate's stock could not qualify under sections 302(b) (2) or
302(b) (3)- Yet it could qualify under section 303 for treatment as
a sale rather than a dividend.
Section 303 contains the following conditions and limitations:
i) The value of the redeemed stock181 must be included in de-
129. T.D. 6152,26 C.F.R. § 1.304-2(c) (1955).
130. Neither gain nor loss would be realized, however, if the redemption price was
equal to the fair market value of the shares at the date of death (or on the optional valua-
tion date, in the case of an election under § 2032), by virtue of § 1014(a).
131. If stock was included in the gross estate and could have been redeemed under
§ 303, the same privilege is extended by § 303(c) to a redemption of "new" stock having
a basis determined by reference to the basis of the stock that was actually included. Section
303(c) permits the redemption of stock acquired after death as a stock dividend or in a
recapitalization or other tax-free exchange, and may be helpful if a redemption of the
original stock would have disturbed the voting rights of the shareholders.
A redemption under § 303 is permissible even though the stock to be redeemed is
[Vol. 9: Page 13
HeinOnline -- 9 Stan. L. Rev. 48 1956-1957
Dec. 1956] STOCK REDEMPTIONS 49
termining the gross estate of a decedent for federal estate tax pur-
poses.' 3 This requirement is satisfied if the value of the stock was
included because it was transferred in contemplation of death, be-
cause the decedent had a power of appointment over it, because it
was held in joint tenancy with the decedent, etc " The stock need
not have been owned by the decedent at the time of his death.
2) The stock of the corporation, whether redeemed or not,
must make up more than thirty-five percent of the decedent's gross
estate or fifty percent of his taxable estate 3  In order to satisfy the
thirty-five percent or fifty percent requirement, the stock of two or
more corporations may sometimes be aggregated' 5
3) The total application of section 303 cannot exceed the sum
of the death taxes imposed because of the decedent's death 36 and
the funeral and administration expenses allowable as deductions
for federal estate tax purposes.'
4) The benefits of section 3o3 are available only to amounts
distributed after the death of the deceden' 8 and within a limited
period (ordinarily four and one-half years) thereafter 3
Section 303 is an expanded version of a provision that was
section 306 stock, according to the Regulations. T.D. 6152, 26 C.F.R. § 1.302-2(d)
(1955). Although the statute is not specific on this point, the Senate Report takes the same
position. SENATE REPORT 239.
132. INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 303(a).
133. T.D. 6152, 26 C.F.R. § 1.303-2(b) (1955).
134. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 303(b) (2) (A).
135. Id. §303(b)(2)(B).
136. Id. §303(a)(1).
137. Id. § 303(a) (2). The Regulations quite properly restrict the "total application"
of § 303 in this manner, as did the old U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.115(g)-1 (c)(6) (1953),
although a literal reading of the statutory language would permit each owner of stock
included in the estate to receive a distribution equal to the sum of the death taxes and the
funeral and administration expenses. T.D. 6152, 26 C.F.R. § 1. 3 03-2 (g) (1955).
Suppose the corporation distributes $15,000 to A and, at a later date, $15,000 to B,
each distribution qualifying under § 303 except that the total death taxes and funeral and
administration expenses amount in the aggregate to only $15,000. The Regulations do not
state whether the allowance is granted to .4 alone or is to be split evenly between A and B.
The latter approach would have the disadvantage of making it impossible to ascertain the
effect of the first distribution until the entire period of time allowed by § 303(b)(1) had
run. See note 139 infra. The Regulations seem to indicate that, in any event, B can derive
no benefit from the fact that A could have claimed exchange treatment for the redemption
under another provision of law, such as § 346(a)(2) or § 302(b)(3). T.D. 6152, 26
C.F.R. § 1.303-2(g) (1955). This seems reasonable, since the purpose of § 303 is to
make funds available to pay estate taxes free of the tax on dividend income. If a redemp-
tion under § 346(a) (2) or § 302(b) (2) has already accomplished this end, there is no
reason for the addition of § 303 benefits.
138. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 303(b)(1).
139. Id. § 303(b)(1)(A). The federal estate tax return is due 15 months after
death. Id. § 6075(a). The tax may be assessed at any time within 3 years after the
return was filed. Id. § 6501(a). And § 303(b) (1)(A) requires that the distribution
be made not later than 90 days after the assessment period. But if a timely petition is filed
with the Tax Court for a redetermination of a deficiency in the estate tax, the time is
extended by § 303(b) (1) (B) until 60 days after the Tax Court decision becomes final.
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enacted in i95o,"' whose purpose was then stated by the House
Committee on Ways and Means as follows:
It has been brought to the attention of your committee that the prob-
lem of financing the estate tax is acute in the case of estates consisting
largely of shares in a family corporation. The market for such shares is
usually very limited, and it is frequently difficult, if not impossible, to
dispose of a minority interest. If, therefore, the estate tax cannot be
financed through the sale of the other assets in the estate, the executors
will be forced to dispose of the family business. In many cases the result
will be the absorption of a family enterprise by larger competitors, thus
tending to accentuate the degree of concentration of industry in this
country.
Your committee is of the opinion that remedial action is desirable in
order to prevent the enforced sale of the family businesses which are so
vital and desirable an element in our system of free private enterprise1 41
Despite its stated purpose of protecting against forced sales, the
danger of which may have been exaggerated, 2 section 303 may be
employed whether the estate is liquid or not. Even more surpris-
ing, stock may be redeemed from specific legatees of stock, donees
of gifts in contemplation of death, trustees of inter vivos trusts, etc.,
even though they may have no obligation to pay any of the death
taxes or expenses that give rise to a section 303 redemption 4  The
statement in the 195o House Report that "the circumstances under
140. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 209, added by 64 STAT. 932 (1950).
141. H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 63, 64 (1950). For pre-1954 law, see
Aarons, Redemption of Stock to Pay Death Taxes, 1952 So. CAuin. TAx INST. 253; Dean,
The New Section 115(g) Regulations, N.Y.U. 11TH INST. ON FED. TAx. 587 (1953).
142. See Harriss, Estate Taxes and the Family-Owned Business, 38 CAtIF. L. Ray.
117, 142-44 (1950).
143. The Regulations state that § 303 "will most frequently have application in
the case where stock is redeemed from the executor or administrator of an estate," and then
go on to say that it is also applicable to stock included in the decedents gross estate and
"held at the time of the redemption by any person who acquired the stock by any of the
means comprehended by" §§ 2031-44 of the Internal Revenue Code (i.e., the pro-
visions defining the gross estate for federal estate tax purposes). The Regulations deny the
benefits of S 303 to persons who acquired their stock by gift or purchase from a person
"to whom such stock has passed from the decedent," or "from the executor in satis-
faction of a specific monetary bequest." T.D. 6152, 26 C.F.R. § 1.303-2(f) (1955).
In thus excluding the transferees of qualified persons, the Regulations carry out the purpose
of § 303, although it contains no explicit limitation of this type.
Because § 303 benefits are available to donees in contemplation of death and similar
transferees of the decedent, such persons may ally themselves with the Commissioner in
an effort to establish that their stock should be included in the gross estate, contrary to the
position of the executor. To this incentive is added the stepped-up basis that the stock,
whether redeemed or not, will get under § 1014(b)(9) if it is included in the gross
estate. The benefits of § 303 and § 1014(b)(9) may outweigh the estate tax cost of
including the stock in the estate, or the shareholder may not care about the estate tax cost
because it will have to be paid by someone else (e.g., the residuary legatees in a case where
apportionment of the estate tax is not required).
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which . . . relief is available are narrowly defined and will restrict
relief to situations in which true hardship exists"'' is not an accu-
rate description either of the i95o legislation or of section 303 as it
exists today.
V. COLLATERAL PROBLEMS
Among the collateral problems that may arise on a partial
liquidation or stock redemption are the following.
x. Computation of Shareholder's Gain or Loss
Since a distribution in partial liquidation is to be treated under
section 331 (a) (2) as "payment in exchange for the stock," gain or
loss is computed as though the stock had been sold. The same is
true of a nondividend redemption which under section 302(a) is
to be "treated as a distribution in part or full payment in exchange
for the stock" or of a redemption to pay death taxes under section
303. If the shareholder owns stock purchased at different times
and for different prices, he may select the shares to be surrendered
to the corporation for redemption, using shares with a high or low
basis and a short or long holding period, as he chooses. "
But while the shareholder may be able to control the tax conse-
quences of the transaction by shrewdly selecting the shares to be
surrendered, he ought not to be able to manipulate the gain or loss
to be recognized by surrendering more shares than would be called
for in an arm's length transaction. If the redemption is not pro
rata, market value will ordinarily govern the number of shares sur-
rendered. But in the case of a pro rata redemption, the number of
shares to be surrendered will usually be a matter of indifference
to the shareholders. Thus, if Corporation X has a net worth of
$ioo,ooo, represented by one hundred shares of common stock,
owned one-half by A and one-half by B, and it distributes $4o,ooo
in partial liquidation, one would expect A and B to surrender
twenty shares each for redemption, but A and B could just as well
surrender twenty-five shares each. Can they minimize their capital
gain or create capital losses, by doing so? It is said that the practice
144. H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1950).
145. John P. Elton, 27 B.T.A. 111 (1942). See Rule v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 979
(10th Cir. 1942). If the shares cannot be identified by date and price of acquisition, how-
ever, the shareholder will have to compute gain or loss on the first-in, first-out basis. U.S.
Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22(a)-8 (1953), Courtenay D. Allington, 31 B.T.A. 421 (1934).
The Commissioner may select an "average cost" basis. Dictum, id. at 424. If designated
shares are called for redemption by the corporation, however, the shareholder may not be
free to substitute other shares with a different basis or holding period.
.Dec. I956]
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of the Internal Revenue Service is to ignore the actual number of
shares surrendered and tax the transaction as though the ratio of
the distribution to the corporation's net worth had governed the
number of shares to be redeemed.' Applied to the example above,
this practice would require recasting the transaction as though A
and B had each surrendered twenty shares. 47 If this were done,
possibly the surrender and redemption of the other five shares per
person would be treated as a contribution to capital, increasing the
basis of his retained shares. In a number of litigated cases, how-
ever, shares were redeemed at par value, original cost, book value
or other artificial prices, and the shareholder's gain or loss was
apparently computed on this basis, rather than by recasting the
transaction as suggested above. 48 But in some instances, the use
of an artificial price in determining the number of shares to be re-
deemed has been regarded by the courts as an indication that the
transaction was "essentially equivalent to the distribution of a tax-
able dividend" under section ii5(g) of the i939 Code' 4
Another problem arises if the shareholder surrenders too few
shares. To vary the foregoing example, what would be the result
if A and B surrendered only ten shares each for redemption? One
possibility would be to accept the transaction as the parties framed
146. Oberndorfer, Partial Liquidations, N.Y.U. 13Tr INST. ON Far. TAX. 637, 650
(1955); Silverstein, Stockholder Gains and Losses on Partial Liquidations, N.Y.U. 14tn
INst. ON FED. TAx. 707, 711 (1956). This practice would require a determination of the
corporation's net worth, which in turn would require a valuation of good will and other
elusive assets.
Just as this Article went to press, the Internal Revenue Service said with reference to
a distribution of cash that constituted a partial liquidation under § 331(a) (2): "In deter-
mining the amount of the gain or loss, regardless of the actual number of shares surren-
dered for redemption by the stockholders, the total number of shares deemed to have been
surrendered is that number which bears the same ratio to the total number of shares out-
standing as the cash distributed bears to the total fair market value of the net assets of
the corporation immediately prior to the distribution." Rev. Rul. 56-513, INT. R v. BULL.
No. 42, at 16, 18.
147. If the 25 shares actually surrendered were purchased at different times and
different prices, could the Commissioner designate which 20 shares are to be used in the
computation of each shareholder's gain or loss? Silverstein, supra note 146, seems to state
that the administrative practice is to use an appropriate fraction of the aggregate basis of
all shares, both those redeemed and those retained, in computing the shareholder's gain
or loss.
148. Keefe v. Cote, 213 F.2d 651 (1st Cir. 1954) (minority shareholder paid sub-
stantially more than majority holder); Commissioner v. Snite, 177 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1949)
(redemption at "somewhat" below market value); Sam Rosania, Sr., 15 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 580 (1956) (par and cost); J. Paul McDaniel, 25 T.C. 276 (1955) (varied prices;
aggregate proceeds equal to cost); Joseph V. Imler, 11 T.C. 836 (1948) (par value and
cost).
149. Pullman, Inc., 8 T.C. 292, 297 (1947). See Lida E. Malone, 45 B.T.A. 305,
310 (1941), revsd, 128 F.2d 967 (5th Cir. 1942). See also Hellman v. Helvering, 68 F.2d
763 (D. C. Cir. 1934).
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it and compute gain or loss accordingly. Another possibility
would be to view the transaction as though A and B had each sur-
rendered twenty shares, with an appropriate reduction in the
basis of the retained shares. Still another possibility would be to
treat the transaction as though A and B had each received $io,ooo
in exchange for ten shares plus a $io,ooo dividend. A recent ruling,
stating that a certain redemption constituted a partial liquidation
"to the extent that the distribution does not exceed the fair market
value of the stock being redeemed,"' ° suggests by negative infer-
ence that if the distribution exceeds the value of the redeemed
stock, the excess would be a section 301 distribution.
Still another problem is the deductibility of a loss, if the share-
holder receives less than the adjusted basis of the shares redeemed.
Section 2 67 disallows losses on the sale or exchange of property be-
tween an individual and a corporation of which he owns more
than fifty percent of the stock.'5 It goes on, however, to make an
exception for "losses in cases of distributions in corporate liquida-
tions." This phrase (as used in section 24 (b)... of the 1939 Code)
probably immunized all nondividend redemptions, " ' whether
they would be classified by the 1954 Code as partial liquidations
under sections 331 (a) (2) and 346 or as redemptions under section
302(a). A continuation of the pre-I954 meaning of the phrase is
suggested by the apparent lack of any intention to narrow its mean-
ing in 1954, " " but there is at least a possibility that it no longer ap-
plies to losses on stock redemptions that do not constitute partial
liquidations under section 346.
Even if the loss is not disallowed by section 267, however, it is
not necessarily deductible. The case of Higgins v. Smith.. is still
to be conjured with, and it might lead to the disallowance of a loss
on the partial liquidation of a one-man corporation, especially if
150. Rev. Rul. 54-408, 1954-2 Ctri. BuLL. 165, 166. See also Roger W. Pope, 15
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 181 (1956); T.D. 6152, 26 C.F.R. § 1.301-1(j) (1955). But see Rev.
Rul. 56-513, Irr. Rav. BuL.. No. 42, at 16.
151. Section 267 has its own set of constructive ownership rules, different from those
found in § 318(a).
152. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 24(b), 53 STAT. 16.
153. Id. § 115(i), 53 STAT. 48, defined the term "amounts distributed in partial
liquidation" only for purposes of § 115. But there is no reason to think that the term
"distributions in liquidation" in id. § 24(b) (1) (B), 53 STAT. 16, did not embrace all
partial liquidations, whether resulting from a corporate contraction or a non-pro rata
redemption.
154. SE;ATE R1posr 226. The definition of partial liquidation in § 346 is for pur-
poses of subchapter C only; hence it is not necessarily controlling under § 267.
155. 308 U.S. 473 (1940).
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the transaction was tax-motivated.5 Where there are a number
of shareholders, however, Higgins v. Smith should not imperil the
deduction if control is dispersed or if the shareholders are affected
unequally by the redemption.
2. The Mystery of the Disappearing Basis
When the redemption of stock is treated as a sale, either because
the transaction is a partial liquidation or because it is a nondivi-
dend redemption (under sections 302(a) or 303), the taxpayer can
offset the basis of the stock against the proceeds of the redemp-
tion. But if the redemption is taxed as a dividend, the mystery of
the disappearing basis presents itself. For example, if A purchases
all the stock of Corporation X for $iooooo and half of the stock
is later redeemed for $150,000 in a transaction that constitutes a
taxable dividend, does the basis of the redeemed shares disappear?
If A had received an ordinary dividend of $i50,ooo, without any
surrender of shares, his cost basis of $ioo,ooo would be intact. There
is no reason why he should be in a worse position when the divi-
dend of $i50,ooo is distributed in redemption of some of his stock.
It is said that under the 1939 Code the Internal Revenue Service
made appropriate adjustments to preserve the shareholder's basis,
156. The cases are inconclusive. In Hellman v. Helvering, 68 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir.
1934), a sole shareholder surrendered 500 shares, with a basis of $50,000, and received
about $24,000. He claimed a loss of $26,000, which was denied, partly because it was
artificially inflated by a redemption price of $48 per share for stock worth about $82 per
share. Another ground was that the distribution was not a true "liquidating distribution"
because the corporation was not in the process of winding up. But the decision also suggests
that the shareholder's loss was not yet determinable because, despite the surrender of shares,
his control of the corporation and financial interest in its operations remained unchanged.
On this theory, the basis of the surrendered shares should be added to the basis of the
remaining shares and the distribution should be treated either as a dividend or as a partial
return of capital. In Kelly v. Commissioner, 97 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1938), involving a pro
rata retirement of stock, the court allowed the loss claimed by one of the shareholders,
distinguishing Hellman v. Helvering, supra, as follows: 'The basis of the court's decision
was the fact that the taxpayer owned all the stock in the corporation and controlled its
actions, and that the transaction in question was a bookkeeping manipulation to create a
loss rather than a bona fide attempt to retire part of the outstanding stock." Kelly v. Com-
missioner, supra at 917. See also Malone v. Commissioner, 128 F.2d 967 (5th Cir. 1942),
following the Kelly case and taking the surprising position that the loss is allowable even
if the corporation pays less than the value of the stock, which would allow shareholders
to create artificial losses by manipulating the price. In the Kelly and Malone cases the Tax
Court had disallowed the claimed losses, relying on Hellman v. Helvering. In doing so,
the Tax Court had expressly stated that the distributions giving rise to the claimed losses
were not distributions in partial liquidation, though it is not clear why they were not nor
why that should be relevant. Lida E. Malone, 45 B.T.A. 305, 310 (1941); Ode R. Kelly,
36 B.T.A. 507, 516 (1937). The Tax Court has disallowed a claimed loss on the surrender
of stock for the purpose of improving the corporation's capital structure (e.g., to remove a
deficit) on the ground that the transaction was a contribution to capital. Bed Rock Pe-
troleum Co., 29 B.T.A. 118 (1933) (surrender for nominal consideration). But see Estate
of William H. Foster, 9 T.C. 930 (1947) (non-pro rata surrenders); Julius C. Ililler, 45
B.T.A. 292 (1941).
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but the statutory foundation for such adjustments was flimsy.'"
The 1954 Code is no better, but the Treasury for the first time has
stated in the Regulations that in such cases "proper adjustment of
the basis of the remaining stock will be made with respect to the
stock redeemed."1 ' Where the corporation has several sharehold-
ers and all the stock of one shareholder is redeemed in a transaction
that is taxed as a dividend (e.g., because he constructively owns the
remaining shares), the "proper adjustment" may be to transfer the
basis of the redeemed shares to the shares owned by the related
shareholders, as the Regulations acknowledge' 9
3. The Basis of Distributed Property
If the shareholder receives property, rather than money, on the
redemption of his stock, he must assign a basis to it for computing
depreciation, gain or loss on a sale, etc. If the property is received
in a distribution in partial liquidation and if gain or loss is recog-
nized on its receipt, section 334 provides expressly that its basis
shall be its fair market value at the time of distribution 6 If the
value of the distributed property happens to be exactly equal to the
adjusted basis of the redeemed shares, so that gain or loss is not
recognized on the exchange, section 334(a) does not explicitly pre-
scribe the basis of the property, but presumably here too fair mar-
ket value is to be used.' If the property is distributed in a non-
157. Katcher, The Case of the Forgotten Basis: An Admonition to Victims of Internal
Revenue Code Section 115(g), 48 MICai. L. REv. 465, 468-69, 470-71 (1950). On several
occasions, courts have held that a redemption constituted a sale of the stock rather than a
taxable dividend under § 115(g) of the 1939 Code, partly because they thought that other-
wise the shareholder's basis would be forfeited. Commissioner v. Snite, 177 F.2d 819, 823
(7th Cir. 1949); Penfield v. Davis, 105 F. Supp. 292, 307-8 (N.D. Ala. 1952), afl'd, 205
F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1953).
158. T.D. 6152, 26 C.F.R. § 1.302-2(c) (1955). On the facts set out in the text,
A would hold the remaining stock of Corporation X at a basis of $100,000. Id. at example 1.
159. Id. at example 2.
160. Section 334(a) provides that the basis of the distributed property is its fair
market value at the time of the distribution if gain or loss is "recognized" on its receipt.
The term "recognized" probably means "recognizable." See Corpus Christi Terminal Co.,
38 B.T.A. 944, 947 (1938). See also Gloyd v. Commissioner, 63 F.2d 649 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 290 U.S. 633 (1933) (no suggestion of estoppel). A taxpayer who was re-
quired, but failed, to report gain on the partial liquidation is probably not estopped to claim
a stepped-up basis for the property received, since the government is apparently protected
by § 1312(6). The partial liquidation seems to be a "transaction on which ...basis
depends" within the meaning of § 1312(6), even though § 334(a) does not tie the basis
to the gain that should have been recognized quite as clearly as, for example, § 358(a). See
Mintz & Plumb, Taxing Income in Years Not Realized Under Doctrine of Equitable
Estoppel, 1954 So. CAxar. TAx INsr. 481, 542-47.
161. In the absence of some other statutory provision prescribing the property's basis,
its basis is "cost." INT. Rnv. CoDE oF 1954, § 1012. Ordinarily there would be no dif-
ference between the fair market value of the property received and the fair market value
of the stock redeemed. See pp. 51-52 supra. As to which is controlling if there is a
Dec. 1956]
HeinOnline -- 9 Stan. L. Rev. 55 1956-1957
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
dividend redemption under sections 3 o2(b) or 303, the Code does
not state explicitly how its basis to the shareholder is to be deter-
mined. 
62
If the property is distributed in a redemption that is, by virtue
of section 3 02(d), treated as a section 301 distribution, its basis to
the shareholder is determined under section 3o (d). If the recipi-
ent is not a corporation, the basis of the property is its fair market
value. If the recipient is a corporation, the basis is the property's
fair market value or its adjusted basis in the hands of the distribut-
ing corporation, adjusted for gain recognized under sections 3 1i (b)
or 311(c), if any, whichever is less.
4. Recognition of Corporate Income
Section 336 provides, as did the Regulations under the 1939
Code,' that no gain or loss shall be recognized by a corporation
upon the distribution of appreciated or depreciated property in
partial or complete liquidation. By virtue of section 453 (d), the
distribution of installment obligations is an exception to this gen-
eral rule-the corporation recognizes gain or loss to the extent of
the difference between the fair market value of an installment
obligation and its basis.
If a corporation distributes property in a redemption that is
treated as an ordinary distribution under section 301, its recogni-
tion of gain or loss is governed by section.311. Gain or loss is not
recognized unless the corporation distributes installment obliga-
tions, certain LIFO inventory or property subject to, or in connec-
tion with which the shareholder assumes, a liability in excess of
the property's basis. The rules of section 311 are probably equally
applicable to a redemption that qualifies for capital gain or loss
treatment under section 302(b). If so, the recognition of gain on
the distribution of certain types of property (i.e., certain LIFO in-
ventory and property with liability in excess of basis) in redemp-
disparity between them, see Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 130 Ct.
Cl. 166, 126 F. Supp. 184 (1954); Greenbaum, The Bads of Property Shall Be the Cost
of Such Property: How Is Cost Defined?, 3 TAx L. Rev. 351 (1948). Note that if the basis
of the distributed property were not its fair market value, but the fair market value of the
stock redeemed (assuming a discrepancy), an unwarranted distinction would be created
between property received in a partial liquidation producing a trivial amount of gain or
loss and that producing neither gain nor loss.
162. See note 160 supra. See also Gloyd v. Commissioner, 63 F.2d 649 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 290 U.S. 633 (1933); Marcus Schlltt, 7 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 354 (1948)
(complete liquidation).
163. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22(a)-20 (1953).
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tion of stock would depend for no apparent reason of policy upon
whether the redemption was a partial liquidation or a section
302(a) redemption, even though both are treated by the share-
holder as sales of the stock. On the other hand, if section 311 is not
applicable to the nondividend redemption 64 the effect on the cor-
poration of redeeming its stock under section 302(a) with appre-
ciated or depreciated property would be governed by pre-i954 case
law, under which no gain or loss would be recognized 6  This, in
turn, would put redemptions of this type on a plane of equality
with redemptions in partial liquidation of the corporation. 6
Even though the distribution of appreciated property does not
itself ordinarily produce taxable income to the corporation, income
realized in form by the shareholders following the distribution may
be imputed to the corporation in accordance with the Court Hold-
ing Co. case.' and similar doctrines, e.g., in the case of a prear-
ranged sale of property by the shareholders after a corporate sale
was called off' 8 These principles apply to a distribution of prop-
erty in redemption of stock, whether the redemption constitutes a
dividend under section 3 o2(d), a sale of stock under section 302(a)
or a partial liquidation under sections 331 (a) (2) and 346."'5 The
164. It is arguable that § 311(a), which by its terms is concerned with distribu-
tions by a corporation "with respect to its stock," does not apply to § 302(a) redemp-
tions, because they are to be treated as distributions "in part or full payment in exchange
for the stock." For another example of this problem of construction, see note 173 infra.
In at least one situation, § 311 is clearly not applicable to a redemption of stock.
If a shareholder purchases property from the corporation and pays for it with stock, the
transaction is not a "distribution, with respect to its stock" within the meaning of § 311.
SENATE REPoRT 247; T.D. 6152, 26 C.F.L § 1.311-1(e)(1), (2) (1955). But this
exclusion is concerned with transactions "between a corporation and a shareholder in his
capacity as debtor, creditor, employee, or vendee, where the fact that such debtor, creditor,
employee, or vendee is a shareholder is incidental to the transaction." Ibid. The purpose of
the exclusion is not to relieve the corporation from recognizing income under § 311(b) and
§ 311(c), but rather to deny the use of § 311(a) to eliminate income on a sale where
the corporation happens to be paid in its own stock. The exclusion is not in itself broad
enough to make § 311 inapplicable to all § 302(a) redemptions, but, on the other hand,
it should not lead to the negative inference that all other transactions by which the cor-
poration exchanges property for its own stock are subject to §§ 311(b) and (c).
165. General Util. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935).
166. On a distribution of installment obligations in a § 302(a) redemption, income
would be recognized by virtue of § 453(d), just as in the case of a distribution of such
obligations in partial liquidation.
167. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
168. Ibid. See also United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950);
T.D. 6152, 26 C.F.R. § 1.346-3 (1955); Bittker, Stock Dividends, Distributions in Kind,
Redemptions, and Liquidations Under the 1954 Code, 1955 So. CALIF. TAx INSr. 349,
360-64; Mintz & Plumb, Dividends in Kind-The Thunderbolts and the New Look, 10
TAx -LRv. 41, 45-50 (1954).
169. Section 337, providing that the corporation shall not recognize gain or loss on
certain sales of property within the 12-month period following the adoption of a plan of
complete liquidation, has no application to property distributed in redemptions that are
not complete liquidations.
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courts may be more ready, however, to impute income to the cor-
poration upon the sale of property, especially inventory, if it was
distributed in a section 3 o2(d) or section 302(a) transaction rather
than in partial liquidation of the corporation.""
5. Effect on Earnings and Profits
The effect of a redemption of stock on the corporation's earn-
ings and profits depends upon whether the redemption is treated
as a distribution under section 301 or as an exchange of the stock
under section 302(a) or sections 331(a) (2) and 346.' If the re-
demption is treated as a distribution of property under section 301,
the corporation's earnings and profits are to be adjusted under sec-
tion 312 in the same way as upon any other dividend, i.e., earnings
and profits are reduced by the amount of money, the principal
amount of any obligations, and the adjusted basis of any other prop-
erty distributed, with special adjustments in the case of a distribu-
ion of appreciated inventory assets, LIFO inventory, or property
subject to liabilities. If the redemption is a partial liquidation or is
treated as a sale of the redeemed stock under sections 302(a) or
303, however, section 3x2(e) provides that the portion of the dis-
tribution which is "properly chargeable to the capital account"
shall not be treated as a distribution of earnings and profits. Neither
the Senate Report nor the Regulations explained how the amount
"properly chargeable to capital account" is to be computed, even
though pre-i954 law was in a state of confusion 2 After the proper
amount has been ascertained and deducted, the balance of the
distribution presumably reduces earnings and profits in accordance
with the rule of section 312(a), as modified by sections 312(b) and
312(c)Y" If the partial liquidation or redemption under sections
170. See United States v. Lynch, 192 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 934 (1952).
171. The corporation may not know whether a redemption constituted a dividend or
a sale, either because the issue is in litigation or because the corporation cannot ascertain
such critical facts as whether a shareholder was, at the time of the redemption, the construc-
tive owner of shares registered in another's name. For a recent instance of a corporation
that did not know, and could not find out, whether it was a personal holding company,
see Coshocton Securities Co., 26 T.C. No. 117 (Aug. 14, 1956).
Note also that if the shareholder has relied upon § 302(c) (2) for relief from the
constructive ownership rules, a distribution that appears to come under § 302(a) may
turn out to be a § 301 distribution if the distributee acquires a disqualifying interest
in the corporation within the following ten years.
172. St. Louis Co. v. United States, 237 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1956); Albrecht, "Divi-
dends" and "Earnings or Profits", 7 TAx L. Rxv. 157, 200-207 (1952).
173. Section 3 12(a) refers to "the distribution of property by a corporation with respect
to its stock," while a redemption that meets the standards of § 302(b) is to be treated,
according to § 302(a), "as a distribution in part or full payment in exchange for the
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302(a) or 303 is not pro rata, the remaining shareholders would
suffer unless an appropriate portion of the liquidating distribution
is charged to earnings and profits. But where all shareholders par-
ticipate equally in the liquidating distribution, it is not easy to
defend a reduction in earnings and profits on the occasion of a
distribution that is not taxed as a dividend' 4
stock." It might be argued that a distribution in exchange for stock is not a distribution
with respect to the stock (see note 164 supra), but the fact that § 312(e) states a "special
rule" following the "general rule" of § 312(a) suggests that after the proper charge
to capital account has been made, the reduction in earnings and profits is governed by
§ 312(a). If so, new complications in applying § 312(e) are introduced by § 312(a) (3).
If a distribution of $50,000 in cash would be charged $40,000 to capital and $10,000 to
earnings and profits, what is the charge upon a distribution of property worth $50,000 but
having an adjusted basis of $45,000? Of $75,000?
174. A reduction in earnings and profits where no dividend tax has been paid by the
shareholders is not made less anomalous by the fact that there are other instances, such as
the distribution of depreciated property under § 312(a) (3), of the same phenomenon.
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